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Sexuality and Incapacity
ALEXANDER A. BONI-SAENZ*
Sexual incapacity doctrines are perhaps the most important form of
sexual regulation, as they control access to sex by designating who is
legally capable of sexual consent. Most states have adopted sexual
incapacity tests for adults that focus narrowly on assessing an
individual’s cognitive abilities. These tests serve an important
protective function for people with temporary cognitive impairments,
such as those rendered incapable due to alcohol or drugs. However,
this comes at the cost of barring many people with persistent cognitive
impairments, such as Down Syndrome or Alzheimer’s Disease, from
any sexual activity. This is despite the fact that said individuals often
still have sexual desires and are able to engage in sexual decisionmaking with support from caregiving networks. The central claim of
this Article is that sexual incapacity doctrine should grant legal
capacity to adults with persistent cognitive impairments if they are
embedded in an adequate decision-making support network. In other
words, the right to sexual expression should not be withheld due to
cognitive impairment alone. To justify this claim, the Article provides
a theory of sexual incapacity doctrine that is grounded in the practice
of supported decision-making and the normative foundations of sexual
capability and relational autonomy. The Article then sets forth a novel
test for sexual consent capacity: cognition-plus. This test focuses on
gauging the capacity for volition, assessing the mental capacity of the
individual to understand the nature and consequences of the sexual
decision, and evaluating the adequacy of the decision-making support
system using principles of fiduciary law. The Article concludes by
applying the cognition-plus test to the case of older adults with
dementia, a group of increasing importance with the aging of the
population.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Henry Rayhons and Donna Young did not expect to find love again after
being widowed.1 They met in their late 60s, and first flirted in church while
singing for the choir. Two years later, they were getting married in front of
over 350 guests. Now in their 70s, they enjoyed several activities together,
such as beekeeping, farming, and long leisurely drives. They also had sex.2 In
2010, Donna was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease. As her condition
worsened, two of her daughters from a previous marriage moved her to a
residential care facility. Henry would regularly visit her, and on one visit in
May 2014, Donna’s roommate thought she heard sexual noises coming from
across the privacy curtain in their shared room. This led Donna’s daughters to
seek guardianship over Donna and to limit Henry’s interactions with her. On
August 8, 2014, Donna passed away. A week later, Henry was arrested and
charged with felony sexual abuse on the basis that Donna Rayhons suffered a

1 This narrative is adapted from Bryan Gruley, Rape Case Asks if Wife with
Dementia Can Say Yes to Her Husband, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-09/rape-case-asks-if-wife-with-dementiacan-say-yes-to-her-husband [http://perma.cc/S7SZ-LPJ4].
2 Id. (“‘It was not a regular thing,’ Rayhons told the agent. At his age, he said, ‘you
forget about that stuff and you just want togetherness.’ He said Donna on occasion asked
for sex by saying, ‘Shall we play a little bit?’ He said he ‘never touched her when she
didn’t want it and I only tried to fulfill her need when she asked for it.’”).
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“mental defect” that made her unable to consent.3 Henry abandoned his run for
another term as a state legislator, and the criminal case garnered national
media attention.4 A week-long trial exposed details of Donna and Henry’s
relationship, Donna’s medical condition, and their alleged sexual encounter in
May. After two days of deliberations, the jury acquitted Henry of
wrongdoing.5
Henry and Donna’s romance highlights how important sexuality can be to
human flourishing, even in later life.6 It can bring pleasure and meaning, and
can serve as a basis for identity and social relationships.7 The criminal charges
against Henry show how the law can be used to regulate these relationships
and sexuality. The sexual incapacity doctrines that were at play in that case are
perhaps the most important form of sexual regulation, as they control access to
sex by designating who is legally capable of sexual consent.8 When someone
is deemed to lack legal capacity, the law imposes civil and criminal liability on
sexual partners for battery and rape.9 In addition, it triggers vicarious liability
3 See Complaint & Affidavit at 1, State v. Rayhons, No. 02411 FECR010718

(Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.dps.state.ia.us/commis/pib/Releases/2014/
Rayhons_Complaint_&_Affidavit.pdf [http://perma.cc/93RR-XK2Q].
4 See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Sex, Dementia and a Husband on Trial at Age 78,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/health/sexdementia-and-a-husband-henry-rayhons-on-trial-at-age-78.html [http://perma.cc/WQ2T7HZT]; Sarah Kaplan, In an Iowa Courtroom, an Astonishing Case of Sex and Alzheimer’s,
WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/
2015/04/07/in-an-iowa-courtroom-an-astonishing-case-of-sex-and-alzheimers/ [http://perma.cc/
4NEU-JLEU].
5 See Tony Leys & Grant Rodgers, Rayhons: ‘Truth Finally Came Out’ with Not
Guilty Verdict, DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/
story/news/crime-and-courts/2015/04/22/henry-rayhons-acquitted-sexual-abuse/26105699/
[http://perma.cc/56J4-LKX7].
6 See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1958 (2000) (“Sexuality
and reproduction are a part of life, for example, as are disability and aging.”).
7 See GARETH MOORE, THE BODY IN CONTEXT: SEX AND CATHOLICISM 64–69 (2001)
(arguing from a Catholic standpoint for the value of sexual pleasure); Gowri
Ramachandran, Delineating the Heinous: Rape, Sex, and Self-Possession, 123 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 371, 386 (2013) (“Who one has sex with often signifies something important about
one’s social identity. It communicates what one finds desirable, who one is desirable to,
even sometimes what one thinks about gender, domestic labor, and children.”); Carole S.
Vance, More Danger, More Pleasure: A Decade After the Barnard Sexuality Conference,
38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 289, 316 (1993) (arguing that an understanding of sexuality must
include an analysis of pleasure). Its absence, however, can cause loss, grief, and
deterioration in health. See Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, To Be or to Exist: Standards for
Deciding Whether Dementia Patients in Nursing Homes Should Engage in Intimacy, Sex,
and Adultery, 42 IND. L. REV. 675, 681–82 (2009) (discussing the negative effects of the
absence of close relationships).
8 See PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT 34–39 (2004) (describing capacity as a
minimum requirement of consent).
9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (noting that
for consent to be valid as a defense to battery the person must have the capacity for
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and regulatory consequences for institutions that are responsible for
safeguarding those with cognitive impairments.10 The threat of this liability
often leads institutions to establish highly restrictive sexual environments,
especially in response to family member requests.11
Sexual incapacity doctrines, however, shape more than just older adult
sexuality. They have a wide reach, affecting sexually precocious minors,
intoxicated teenagers on college campuses, and younger adults with Down
Syndrome as well.12 Most states have adopted incapacity tests for adults that
focus narrowly on assessing an individual’s cognitive abilities.13 These tests
serve an important protective function for individuals with temporary and
transient incapacity, such as those rendered incapable due to alcohol or
drugs.14 However, this comes at the cost of barring many people with
persistent forms of incapacity from any sexual activity.15 This is despite the
consent); 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 282 (15th ed. 1995)
(describing incapacity as vitiating consent in the context of rape).
10 See Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis
of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563,
563 (1988) (“‘Vicarious liability’ may be defined as the imposition of liability upon one
party for a wrong committed by another party.”); Elizabeth Hill, Note, We’ll Always Have
Shady Pines: Surrogate Decision-Making Tools for Preserving Sexual Autonomy in Elderly
Nursing Home Residents, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469, 479 (2014) (discussing the
regulatory consequences in the context of nursing homes).
11 See Daniel Engber, Naughty Nursing Homes: Is It Time to Let the Elderly Have
More Sex?, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the_sex_issue/
2007/09/naughty_nursing_homes.html [http://perma.cc/JJ2M-P8WG] (“Why are nursinghome administrators so queasy about sexual expression? They’re afraid of getting sued.”).
There is a notable exception to this trend. See Bryan Gruley, Boomer Sex with
Dementia Foreshadowed in Nursing Home, BLOOMBERG (July 22, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-22/boomer-sex-with-dementia-foreshadowedin-nursing-home [http://perma.cc/4RKJ-HVYA] (discussing the sex-positive policies of
Hebrew Home in New York).
12 See State v. McCurdy, No. 13-0460, 2014 WL 467916, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5,
2014) (minors); Nicholson v. Commonwealth, 694 S.E.2d 788, 789 (Va. Ct. App. 2010)
(Down Syndrome); Amanda Hess, How Drunk Is Too Drunk to Have Sex?,
SLATE (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2015/02/
drunk_sex_on_campus_universities_are_struggling_to_determine_when_intoxicated.html
[http://perma.cc/2WWG-DYCM] (students on college campuses).
13 See, e.g., Melton v. State, 639 S.E.2d 411, 415 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that the
victim could not “understand the consequences of her actions, including sexual acts”); Durr
v. State, 493 S.E.2d 210, 212–13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasizing the victim’s weak
memory capacity and the inability to relate cause and effect).
14 See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for
Reform, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 186 (2002) (discussing how the incapacity test helps
“protect and vindicate the right of all citizens to be free of nonconsensual sexual
exploitation”).
15 See Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 315, 324 (“In nearly all institutions, such a high consent standard can totally prohibit
sexual relations among residents.”).
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fact that said individuals often still have sexual desires and are able to engage
in sexual decision-making with support from caregiving networks.16 By
applying a test that focuses narrowly on cognitive abilities to individuals with
persistent impairments, courts are unnecessarily and permanently restricting
the sexual expression of millions of individuals, with intensely negative social,
psychological, and health consequences.
The central claim of this Article is that sexual incapacity doctrine should
grant legal capacity to adults with cognitive impairments if they are embedded
in an adequate decision-making support network. In other words, the right to
sexual expression should not be withheld due to cognitive impairment alone.
To justify this claim, it provides a theory of sexual incapacity doctrine that is
normatively grounded in sexual capability—a concept derived from the
capabilities approach in economics and moral philosophy.17 Sexual capability
is the opportunity to achieve certain states of being or perform certain
activities associated with sexuality, such as experiencing sexual pleasure or
forming a sexual identity.18 An individual’s sexual capability is a product not
only of that person’s cognitive abilities, but also of her social resources and the
legal treatment of those abilities and resources. For people with persistent
cognitive impairments, those resources often include a decision-making
support network composed of a single caregiver, a set of family members, or
an institution’s staff. These supportive networks highlight the relational nature
of autonomy in the lived experience of people with persistent cognitive
impairments.19
With this normative understanding, the Article sets forth a novel sexual
consent capacity test for this population: cognition-plus.20 It derives its name
from a joint focus on the mental capacities of the subject (cognition) and the
recognition that some individuals achieve sexual decision-making capacity
through the assistance of a decision-making support network (plus). The test
proceeds in three general steps. The first step is to gauge whether the
individual has the threshold capacity to express volition with respect to a
sexual decision. Without this manifestation of desire, one cannot proceed to be
a sexual agent. If the first step is satisfied, the second step is to assess whether
the individual has the necessary mental capacities to understand and reason
about the nature and consequences of a given sexual decision. If one meets this
requirement, then one has sexual consent capacity without the need for
assistance.
If one does not meet that requirement, however, the third step is to
evaluate whether there is an adequate decision-making support network in
place. These networks can provide support to an individual in formulating her
16 Id. at 324–30.
17 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN

DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992).
18 See infra Part III.A.
19 See infra Part III.B.
20 See infra Part IV.A.
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purposes, connecting her desires with options, communicating with others, and
creating a safe space to engage in sexual expression. Assessment of the system
would be contextual in nature, guided by the principles of loyalty and care
from fiduciary law. Thus, courts would evaluate whether the system is free
from conflicts of interest, has adequate knowledge of the individual and the
sexual decision, and has taken reasonable steps to protect the individual with
cognitive impairments from the threat of sexually transmitted diseases and
pregnancy. If the system is adequate, then the individual possesses sexual
consent capacity.
The Article concludes by applying the cognition-plus test to the specific
case of older adults with dementia.21 This population has received scant
attention in the legal literature, even though it is a group of increasing
importance with the aging of the population.22 The cognition-plus test would
facilitate sexual expression among older adults with dementia by removing an
unnecessary threat of liability from nursing homes and assisted living
facilities, provided they supply an adequate supported decision-making
environment. At the same time, it maintains the protective nature of sexual
incapacity doctrines for those with persistent cognitive impairments.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides the background for
understanding adult sexual incapacity doctrines. It defines key concepts,
presents a taxonomy of incapacity, reviews how doctrines exert regulatory
control over sexual life, and examines the weaknesses with existing doctrinal
approaches. Part III argues for sexual capability as the normative basis of
sexual incapacity doctrine and introduces the emerging concept and practice of
supported decision-making, a manifestation of relational autonomy. Part IV
outlines the key features of the cognition-plus test for sexual consent capacity
and applies it to the case of older adults with dementia.

II. SEXUALITY AND INCAPACITY
This Part provides the background for understanding the sexual incapacity
doctrine, its effects, and the contexts in which it is applied. Part A defines the
key terms of sexuality and incapacity. It also introduces a taxonomy of the
four contexts of incapacity, which are differentiated primarily by their
temporal scopes. Part B examines how the law in this area exerts regulatory
power through its imposition of liability on sexual partners and through its part
in creating and reinforcing social norms. Part C reviews existing doctrinal and
scholarly tests of sexual incapacity and their weaknesses.

21 See infra Part IV.B.
22 See Liesi E. Hebert et al., Alzheimer Disease in the US Population: Prevalence

Estimates Using the 2000 Census, 60 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 1119, 1120 (2003)
(projecting that the number of people with Alzheimer’s Disease will increase to 13.2
million by 2050).
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A. Definitions
In this Article, I adopt a broad definition of sexuality, encompassing the
variety of desires, practices, identities, and relationships deemed sexual by an
individual.23 Thus, it includes the desire for sexual pleasure and the objects
towards whom it is directed or not directed.24 It also encompasses practices
deemed sexual, including everything from holding hands and flirting to
stimulation of the genitals, “kinky sex,” and a host of other practices.25 These
sexual practices, in turn, may help to form one’s identity, which could be
based on one’s objects of desire (e.g., heterosexual), one’s sexual proclivities
(e.g., dominatrix), or one’s method of sociosexual interaction (e.g., “ladies
man”).26 Finally, these desires, practices, and identities are social in nature, as
other people are often the targets of desire, the participants in sexual activities,
or members of shared sexual communities.27 This definition is capacious, with
the goal of being inclusive of the many forms sexuality takes.28
Sexuality is also important.29 It represents a unique source of pleasure,
meaning, and social connection.30 The Supreme Court has recognized a sexual

23 See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry into the

Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 217, 219 (1988) (defining sexuality as “in its
broadest sense to refer to the full range of intimate connectedness that we might
experience, including, but not limited to, sexual love or ‘eros.’”). My definition embraces
the notion that sexuality is defined in part by a given social context in which an individual
is situated. See JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY 7 (Routledge 2d ed. 2003) (1986) (claiming
that “what we define as ‘sexuality’ is a historical construction, which brings together a host
of different biological and mental possibilities, and cultural forms—gender identity, bodily
differences, reproductive capacities, needs, desires, fantasies, erotic practices, institutions
and values—which need not be linked together, and in other cultures have not been”).
24 See IGOR PRIMORATZ, ETHICS AND SEX 46 (1999) (defining sexual desire as the
“desire for certain bodily pleasures”); Alan H. Goldman, Plain Sex, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
267, 268 (1977) (defining sexual desire as “desire for contact with another person’s body
and for the pleasure which such contact produces”).
25 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1461, 1504 (2012)
(discussing the importance of considering all sexual practices, “mainstream or outlandish,
common or unusual, quotidian or kinky, normal or deviant”).
26 See Ramachandran, supra note 7, at 386.
27 See, e.g., JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 23–39 (1983)
(tracing the creation of an urban gay subculture after World War II).
28 It also reflects the reality that defining sex, a core facet of sexuality, is exceedingly
difficult. Philosophers of sexuality have debated this conceptual-definitional question at
length, with some claiming that no satisfying definition of sex is readily available. See
RAJA HALWANI, PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE 123–30 (2010) (discussing
how specifications of sex fail through counterexample).
29 The degree of importance will vary across the population, with asexuals perhaps
finding it less important than most due to the lack of sexual attraction they experience. See
generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 303, 316 (2014)
(“[C]ontemporary asexuality is generally defined by two related ideas: lack of sexual
attraction and lack of choice.”). The relatively capacious definition of sexuality used in this
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liberty interest in Lawrence v. Texas, though its dimensions are actively
debated by scholars.31 Other areas related to sexuality have also received
constitutional protection. Marriage, which is the social institutionalization of a
form of sexuality, has been deemed fundamental by the Court.32 The Court has
also closely guarded the related principle of bodily integrity, though the
constitutional justifications for this principle vary.33 Whatever the contours of
a right to sexual expression might be, the degree to which it extends to people
who have cognitive impairments remains unexplored.34
Capacity and incapacity are functional concepts. This means that
incapacity is assessed with respect to the ability to make a particular decision,

Article would still be inclusive of the asexual experience, even if the legal implications of
sexual contact that are explored here might not be as relevant for that population.
30 See PAUL R. ABRAMSON & STEVEN D. PINKERTON, WITH PLEASURE: THOUGHTS ON
THE NATURE OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 8–10 (rev. ed. 2002) (discussing the neurobiology of
sexual pleasure); Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 277, 282–83 (2008) (describing the value of sex to women in
particular).
31 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The literature on the meaning of
Lawrence is voluminous. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian
Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 21 (arguing that Lawrence
stands for a broad liberty-based sexual entitlement); Katherine M. Franke, The
Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2004)
(arguing the sexual right does not extend beyond the bedroom); Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty
After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1060 (2004) (arguing that the scope of Lawrence’s
liberty interest is primarily constrained by consideration of third-party interests).
32 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“Over time and in other
contexts, the Court has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due
Process Clause.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (characterizing marriage as
“fundamental to our very existence and survival”). Some scholars, however, remain
skeptical that the right to marry is more than a minimal right of equal access or that it is
fundamental as a matter of due process. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2118 (2005).
33 Sometimes it is rooted in an understanding of the body as being integral to a
concept of personal autonomy or negative freedom against governmental intrusion. See
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the state forcibly pumping a
suspect’s stomach for evidence “shocks the conscience”); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person . . . .”). At other points, it reflects a positive right to privacy, which indirectly
protects some forms of reproductive sexuality. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53
(1973) (recognizing a sphere of personal privacy that protected a variety of autonomous
decisions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972) (protecting a right to the use
of contraception, regardless of marital status).
34 The Court has explored the scope of other important rights in situations of
incapacity. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the refusal of medical treatment, which can
be exercised through surrogates during periods of incapacity).
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rather than as a general status.35 For instance, one might lack the capacity to
engage in complex financial transactions, but still have the capacity to decide
whether to eat broccoli or asparagus for lunch. Thus, we have numerous
decisional capacity “switches,” which may be flipped on or off in various
constellations. These switches may be understood either mentally or legally.36
Mental incapacity is the condition of lacking the requisite psychological
abilities to engage in autonomous decision-making.37 The primary form is
cognitive incapacity, or the inability to process decisions. In this situation, one
either cannot appreciate information necessary to understand a decision or has
defects in reasoning and judgment. In shorthand: “She didn’t know what she
was doing.”38 Mental incapacity is the product not only of internal
psychological faculties but also of external circumstances. For example,
people with Alzheimer’s Disease sometimes experience the phenomenon of
“sundowning.”39 These individuals may be relatively lucid when waking up in

35 See THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT
TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 23 (1998)
(discussing how capacity must be considered in terms of “the match or mismatch between
the patient’s abilities and the decision-making demands of the situation that the patient
faces”); Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Default Legal Person, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1176
(2007) (arguing that judges created a “default legal person” whose capacities varied by the
doctrinal area in question); Lawrence A. Frolik & Mary F. Radford, “Sufficient” Capacity:
The Contrasting Capacity Requirements for Different Documents, 2 NAELA J. 303, 305
(2006) (discussing the different levels of capacity required for different legal tasks).
36 Some authors call what I refer to as mental capacity simply as “capacity” while
referring to the legal evaluation of mental capacity as “competence.” See, e.g., Michael L.
Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and
the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257, 263 (2014).
37 See generally Kathryn Kaye & Jim Grigsby, Medical Factors Affecting Mental
Capacity, in CHANGES IN DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY IN OLDER ADULTS 91 (Sara Honn
Qualls & Michael A. Smyer eds., 2007) (describing the various conditions that can cause
decreases in mental capacity).
38 See 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 316–17 (1986).
The second type of mental incapacity is volitional incapacity, in which one can take in
information and reason about it, but cannot act in accordance with it. As an example, an
individual with certain serious forms of obsessive-compulsive disorder might find herself
under some kind of compulsion to act, even if it might not be what she wants. In shorthand,
this translates as “She couldn’t help herself.” See id. The third type of mental incapacity is
communicative incapacity, or the inability to express a decision to others. For example, an
individual who has suffered a stroke may be fully capable of forming preferences,
processing information, and coming to a decision, but cannot express this choice to others.
See id.; see also George J. Demakis, State Statutory Definitions of Civil
Incompetency/Incapacity: Issues for Psychologists, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 331, 332
(2013) (noting that several states explicitly require communication skills in their incapacity
statutes).
39 See Ladislav Volicer et al., Sundowning and Circadian Rhythms in Alzheimer’s
Disease, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 704, 704–05 (2001).
TO
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the morning, but at sundown their dementia will increase, leading to confusion
and the inability to process decisions.40
Legal incapacity, in contrast, is the condition of lacking the requisite legal
authority to engage in autonomous decision-making. Put another way, the
legal capacity inquiry determines whether a person is a legally recognized
subject or not.41 Legal capacity is a prerequisite to making various decisions,
such as voting, getting married, or hiring a lawyer.42 Being deemed a legally
recognized subject may also expose an individual to negative consequences to
which a person who lacks legal capacity would not be subject, such as criminal
liability for illegal acts.43
This Article uses the term legal incapacity doctrine to refer to any civil or
criminal legal doctrine that deems an individual to lack decisional capacity in a
particular domain. Sexual incapacity doctrines refer to those doctrines that do
this with respect to sexual decision-making. In other words, even if one gives
unambiguous, verbal, affirmative consent to sex—what I call apparent
consent—this “Yes” may be transformed into a legal “No” by the sexual
incapacity doctrine.44 Sexual incapacity doctrines are part and parcel of a legal
regime of sexual consent.45 They serve to vitiate apparent consent due to some
internal problem with perception, cognition, or emotion.46 This contrasts with

40 Id.
41 See Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests of

Autonomy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 321, 323 (2003) (“The determination
of incapacity represents a crucial dividing line between legal subjects and those who are
the object of legal protections.”).
42 See Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225,
256 (1997) (noting that capacity to marry is one of the few elements of common law
marriage); Cynthia Godsoe, All in the Family: Towards a New Representational Model for
Parents and Children, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 303, 334 (2011) (discussing the
requirements of Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.14, governing attorney
interactions with clients of diminished capacity); Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S.
Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect of Mental Impairment on
the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 935–45 (2007) (reviewing the
constitutional and statutory provisions requiring capacity to vote).
43 See generally Arlie Loughnan, Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal Law, 15
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2012) (reviewing how mental incapacity doctrines play out in
criminal law).
44 See Emily J. Stine, When Yes Means No, Legally: An Eighth Amendment Challenge
to Classifying Consenting Teenagers as Sex Offenders, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1183
(2011) (discussing this transformation in the context of statutory rape). Just because one
cannot give legal consent to sex does not mean that one cannot dissent from sex. See
People v. Thompson, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 810 (Ct. App. 2006) (“Even a severely disabled
person may object to a sexual touching because he or she finds it unpleasant—a ‘bad
touch’; this does not necessarily mean he or she could give legal consent.”).
45 See ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 215 (2003).
46 See JOAN MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE?: ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING
WOMEN’S CONSENT SERIOUSLY 141 (2005).
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coercion or deception doctrines, which focus on external factors that vitiate
consent because it is not voluntary or informed.47
Mental and legal incapacity converge in many cases. Consider a recent
case of intoxication and rape from Vanderbilt University.48 On June 23, 2013,
a young woman was drinking with several football players at an establishment
called the Tin Roof Bar.49 On the way back to their dorm, she passed out.50
Several of the football players carried her body to the room of one of the
players and proceeded to penetrate her mouth and vagina with their fingers and
penises, as well as to insert a water bottle into her anus.51 All the while, they
documented the event with their cell phones and sent text messages to other
players.52 The sexual incapacity doctrine uncontroversially applies in cases
such as this, when the subject is unconscious.53 The lack of consciousness
means that there is no capacity or opportunity to express volition—either in
acceptance or refusal of sexual contact.54 Two of the Vanderbilt players have
been convicted of rape, with other involved players facing a variety of
charges.55
Mental and legal evaluations of incapacity may also diverge. One may be
deemed legally capable when one arguably does not have the mental capacity
for certain decisions. The application of the mature minor doctrine to minors
who are convicted of serious crimes may be such an example.56 Conversely,
one may in fact be able to make certain decisions—in other words, one may
47 This is not to say that these doctrines do not overlap or interact in many cases. See
id. at 141–42 (“Notice that sometimes these categories are blurred, for
example, . . . someone who is mentally retarded, an internal condition, is more likely to
believe something that a ‘normal’ adult would not, and thereby would be more vulnerable
to fraud.”).
48 See Tony Gonzalez, What Happened in the Vanderbilt Dorm? Rape Trial Starts
Monday, TENNESSEAN (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/crime/2014/
11/01/happened-dorm-room-vanderbilt-rape-trial-starts-monday/18277999/ [http://perma.cc/
XL4J-UPF4].
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See Tony Gonzalez, Vanderbilt Rape Trial: Complete List of Charges,
TENNESSEAN (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/crime/2015/01/27/
vandebilt-rape-trial-verdict-breakdown/22385025/ [http://perma.cc/97C5-PF7F].
52 See Vanderbilt Rape Trial: Defendants Found Guilty on all Charges, TENNESSEAN
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2015/01/27/vanderbilt-rape-caseverdicts/22419381/ [http://perma.cc/QBK2-TN33].
53 See Commonwealth v. Erney, 698 A.2d 56, 59–60 (Pa. 1997) (accepting that
unconscious sex is rape but exploring what unconsciousness means in the context of the
Pennsylvania statute).
54 See id.
55 See Vanderbilt Rape Trial: Defendants Found Guilty on all Charges, supra note 52
(noting that the deliberations took three hours for a trial that lasted 12 days).
56 See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 547, 548 (2000) (noting that even “[y]ouths who are in elementary school may be
deemed adults for purposes of assigning criminal responsibility and punishment”).
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not be psychologically impaired at all—but be deemed legally incapable of
doing so. An example of this is the doctrine of coverture, which deemed a
married woman legally incapable of making decisions about property because
her legal personality had merged with that of her husband.57
There are four primary types of mental incapacity, which are primarily
differentiated by their temporal scopes.58 Temporary extended incapacity, such
as minority (i.e. being a minor), has a long duration but a definite end point.
The mental incapacity is due to the fact that the individual’s psychological
faculties are not yet mature, but almost everyone will eventually age out of this
condition.59 In contrast to minority, temporary transient incapacity is
relatively short-lived—it comes and goes. Examples include intoxication,
episodic mental illness, or bouts of delirium.60 Persistent lifelong incapacity
does not go away and exists from a very early age. There is no “aging out,”
and there is no “wearing off.” The paradigmatic example is intellectual
disability, an umbrella term for a variety of cognitive impairments, including
genetic conditions such as Down Syndrome.61 Finally, persistent acquired
incapacity exists when a person suffers an impairment that does not go away,
but which arises after a period of relatively unimpaired functioning.62 The
paradigmatic example is dementia. The persistent incapacities are the primary
57 See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 841–48

(2004) (reviewing the place of coverture in the canon of family law but noting its continued
existence in other forms).
58 See DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, CONSENT IN THE LAW 96 (2007)
(discussing the “non-ideal-types” that deviate from the standard capable subject: “Some
involve ostensible agents who are temporarily incapacitated or who have incapacitated
themselves; some involve potential ostensible agents; some involve parties who are no
longer ostensible agents; and some parties who never have been and never will be
ostensible agents.”).
59 See DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 116 (1998) (“They are not permanently
disabled since they will (normally) acquire this capacity with age.”); Jennifer Ann Drobac
& Leslie A. Hulvershorn, The Neurobiology of Decision Making in High-Risk Youth and
the Law of Consent to Sex, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 502, 504 (2014) (arguing that
neurobiological evidence demonstrates that juveniles have different and less developed
cognitive processes for sexual decision-making). Unfortunately, some individuals pass
away before they reach the age of majority.
60 See FEINBERG, supra note 38, at 320–21 (noting that sometimes these conditions
can be recurring).
61 See Natalie Cheung, Defining Intellectual Disability and Establishing a Standard of
Proof: Suggestions for a National Model Standard, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 317, 321–25
(2013) (describing the different definitions of intellectual disability adopted by various
professional organizations).
62 This raises interesting and difficult issues of personal identity, as the preexisting
self may have sexual interests that extend to the present impaired self. See A. Harry Lesser,
Dementia and Personal Identity, in DEMENTIA: MIND, MEANING, AND THE PERSON 55, 56–
61 (Julian C. Hughes et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the relationship of one’s self to one’s
past); Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, Sexual Expression and Intimacy Between Nursing Home
Residents with Dementia: Balancing the Current Interests and Prior Values of
Heterosexual and LGBT Residents, 21 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 459, 460 (2012).
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focus of this Article, as the law is currently poorly calibrated to their unique
nature.63

B. Liability and Social Norms
Sexual incapacity doctrines exert regulatory control by imposing legal
liability and influencing social norms about sexuality. The primary target for
liability is the sexual partner of the person lacking legal capacity. Secondary
targets are individuals or institutions that in some way have responsibility for
individuals deemed to lack capacity.64 Criminal liability arises from
prohibitions on rape or sexual assault, which are applied to the sexual partner
of the person lacking legal capacity.65 Civil liability arises from tortious
battery, which involves a tortfeasor engaging in harmful or offensive contact.66
Consent serves as an affirmative defense to such a claim, but that defense is
unavailable when the party in question is incapable of consenting.67 In
63 It is important to keep in mind that these types of incapacity are not mutually

exclusive. See, e.g., KATE GORDON ET AL., IDD AND DEMENTIA 28 (July 2015),
http://www.aoa.acl.gov/AoA_Programs/HPW/Alz_Grants/docs/IDD-and-Dementia.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BAR8-DND8] (discussing the challenges of identifying and providing
services to those who have both intellectual disabilities, a persistent lifelong incapacity,
and dementia, a persistent acquired incapacity). In addition, people with persistent lifelong
incapacity experience the temporary extended incapacity of minority, and anyone can
experience the temporary transient incapacity of intoxication along with one of the other
forms of incapacity.
64 See, e.g., Lindeman v. The Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1208 (D. Colo. 2014) (church); Bjerke v. Johnson,
727 N.W.2d 183, 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (farm employer); Doe v. Mama Taori’s
Premium Pizza, LLC, No. M1998-00992-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL 327906, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Apr. 5, 2001) (restaurant employer).
65 See TORCIA, supra note 9, § 282; Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the
Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1780, 1797–98 (1992) (discussing the liability regime of criminal rape). Sexual incapacity
doctrines can be helpful to prosecutors when consent is ambiguous. See Commonwealth v.
Fuller, 845 N.E.2d 434, 439 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (noting how prosecutors used evidence
of incapacity to prove lack of consent when complainant and defendant dispute whether
sex was consensual).
66 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“An actor is
subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other
directly or indirectly results.”); id. § 18 (substantially the same provision but offensive
contact results); Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in
Civil Courts: Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 67–
84 (2006) (describing how tort suits may be a useful alternative to criminal trials for
victims of sexual assault).
67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“To be
effective, consent must be (a) by one who has the capacity to consent or by a person
empowered to consent for him, and (b) to the particular conduct, or to substantially the
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addition to that direct civil liability, there may be vicarious civil liability for
institutions. For example, the family of a nursing home resident might press a
claim for negligent supervision if that resident was sexually battered while in
the institution’s care.68
Finally, institutions face a body of regulatory law that punishes them for
inappropriately caring for people who lack capacity and who are in their
care.69 This may include the loss of state or federal funding, which would have
disastrous consequences for institutions that are reliant on such money.70 It
could further include loss of accreditation by relevant quasi-governmental
regulatory bodies.71 Finally, individuals that work at such institutions might
face sanctions in the form of revocation of professional licensure.72
These impacts were on display in a recent case in which a 78-year old man
and an 87-year old woman, both with dementia, were discovered having sex in
same conduct.”). See generally Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery:
Confusion and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585 (2012) (exploring how intent and
consent play out in the tort of battery).
68 See, e.g., Ayuluk v. Red Oaks Assisted Living, Inc., 201 P.3d 1183, 1190 (Alaska
2009) (adjudicating a vicarious liability claim for sexual assault of cognitively impaired
patient by certified nurse’s assistant); Regions Bank & Trust v. Stone Cty. Skilled Nursing
Facility, Inc., 49 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Ark. 2001) (adjudicating a negligent supervision claim
for sexual assault of a semi-comatose patient); Jennifer Gimler Brady, Long-Term Care
Under Fire: A Case for Rational Enforcement, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 40
(2001) (“Tort lawsuits against nursing homes, as well as the size of verdicts in such cases,
are increasing at an alarming pace.”); Marshall B. Kapp, Malpractice Liability in LongTerm Care: A Changing Environment, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1235, 1239 (1991)
(discussing the increasing liability concerns of nursing homes); Michael L. Rustad,
Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of Noneconomic Damage Caps on Meritorious
Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 ELDER L.J. 331, 385–87 (2006) (noting that forty-two percent
of cases against nursing homes used a negligent supervision theory).
69 See Philip C. Aka et al., Political Factors and Enforcement of the Nursing Home
Regulatory Regime, 24 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 8 (2011) (discussing the history of nursing home
regulations).
70 See William Pipal, You Don’t Have to Go Home but You Can’t Stay Here: The
Current State of Federal Nursing Home Involuntary Discharge Laws, 20 ELDER L.J. 235,
247–48 (2012) (“Because nursing homes receive more than sixty percent of their income
from Medicaid and Medicare, the loss of federal funding can have significant financial
consequences.”).
71 See Frederick Robinson & Melissa Thompson, Accreditation, Licensure,
Certification, and Surveying Bodies, in 3 RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK FOR
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 53, 60–62 (Glenn T. Troyer ed., 6th ed. 2011) [hereinafter
RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK] (describing the work of the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the voluntary body that accredits many health
care organizations).
72 See Carl F. Ameringer, State-Based Licensure of Telemedicine: The Need for
Uniformity but Not a National Scheme, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 55, 70–84 (2011)
(examining the licensing and disciplinary functions of state boards); Jennifer P. Lundblad,
Rethinking Patient Safety Regulation: A Framework for Evaluating Regulatory Tools, 32
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 437, 438–41 (2011) (describing the professional licensing
regime).
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a nursing home.73 When nurses tried to remove the woman from the situation,
she screamed and bit and kicked them, showing her displeasure with the
termination of the sexual contact. The head administrative staff had to
determine whether to report the incident to the Iowa Department of
Inspections and Appeals as a sexual assault. They concluded that no report
was necessary, because there was no injury or evidence of force, and the
woman appeared to consent to the encounter. They did, however, tell the
families of the residents about the encounter, and the family of the woman
sued the nursing home and nursing home staff, alleging rape. The Iowa
Department of Inspections and Appeals caught wind of the situation, fined the
nursing home, and threatened a loss of Medicaid and Medicare funding. The
nursing home responded by expelling the man in the encounter to a nursing
home more than two hours away from his family and firing the director of
nursing and the nursing home administrator. The Iowa Board of Nursing
revoked the license of the director of nursing as well.74
In addition to these explicit legal and regulatory effects, the law has
expressive effects when it invalidates the apparent consent choices of those
who are deemed to lack legal capacity.75 This is clearest in the case of criminal
prohibitions, which carry the weight of societal condemnation for the acts that
are deemed criminal.76 But both civil and criminal doctrines act to construct
the sexualities of citizens by demarcating the boundaries of acceptable and
unacceptable sex and reinforcing existing understandings of the sexuality of
certain groups.77 Thus, the sanction and expressive functions of the law work
in mutually reinforcing ways to regulate sexuality both in the behavior and
attitudes of the people they govern.
73 This narrative is adapted from Gruley, supra note 11, and Steve Drobot, Case No.

11-003, (Iowa Bd. of Nursing Home Adm’rs Sept. 11, 2012) (notice of hearing and
statement of charges), http://www.idph.state.ia.us/IDPHChannelsService/file.ashx?file=
AEA204EE-AC91-428C-90E3-173949AE5407 [http://perma.cc/2QGL-SVPE].
74 After a hearing, the Iowa Board of Nursing Home Administrators concluded that
the nursing home administrator should keep his license. See Drobot, supra note 73, at 25.
75 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1514–27 (2000) (examining the difficulties
of conceptualizing the state as an agent of expression); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2051 (1996) (“Many debates over the
appropriate content of law are really debates over the statement that law makes,
independent of its (direct) consequences. . . . [T]he expressive function of law has a great
deal to do with the effects of law on prevailing social norms.”).
76 See JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING &
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970); CHARLES FRIED, AN
ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 125–32 (1970).
77 See MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 128–31 (1992) (discussing
how the law’s regulation of sex creates a certain normative vision of sexuality); Kate
Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of
Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313, 313 (2003) (describing how the
law helps to construct adolescent sexuality).
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C. Problems with Existing Approaches
In criminal law, state statutes prescribe sexual incapacity. The standard
statutory construction is to list a variety of incapacitating conditions that
vitiate consent, including everything from age to intoxication, mental disorder,
being asleep, or being in the custody of the state.78 Other statutes use more
general language, just referencing “mental incapacity” or “unsoundness of
mind.”79 Courts have interpreted this more general language flexibly,
including various conditions under it.80 In tort law, judges often draw from the
criminal law’s methods of constructing incapacity on a case-by-case basis.81
After the conditions potentially constituting incapacity have been
identified and labeled, courts must flesh out what these identifying labels mean
78 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(1)(b) (2010) (“The victim is incapable

of consent by reason of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep or any other
similar impairment of cognition . . . .”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111 (2015) (separating out
minority, mental illness or unsoundness of mind, involuntary intoxication,
unconsciousness, in legal custody, or under educational supervision); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.011(b) (West 2011) (listing eleven different conditions). People with persistent
cognitive impairments are often referred to by antiquated terms such as “mentally
defective.” See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2005); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(A) (2013). Even when statutes spell out these different situations of
incapacity, courts sometimes interpret factual situations that would clearly fall under one
prong of the statute under another prong. See, e.g., State v. Farnum, 554 N.W.2d 716, 721
(Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (“It appears the ‘incapacity’ alternative of section 709.4(2)(a) is
generally applied in cases of retarded or low-functioning victims. However, nothing in the
statute or case law indicates the term ‘incapacity’ could not extend to a person rendered
unconscious from intoxication.” (citations omitted)).
79 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A) (2014) (“If any person has sexual
intercourse with a complaining witness, whether or not his or her spouse . . . through the
use of the complaining witness’s mental incapacity or physical helplessness . . . he or she
shall be guilty of rape.”). Mental incapacity is often provided for in a definitions section.
See id. § 18.2-67.10(3) (defining “mental incapacity” as “condition of the complaining
witness existing at the time of an offense under this article which prevents the complaining
witness from understanding the nature or consequences of the sexual act involved in such
offense and about which the accused knew or should have known”); see also IDAHO CODE
§ 18-6101(3) (Supp. 2015) (“unsoundness of mind”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(A)(2) (Supp.
2015) (same).
80 See, e.g., Molina v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 470, 474 (Va. 2006) (rejecting a
construction of the Virginia statute that would not include intoxication under the definition
of the mental incapacity); see also Ragsdale v. State, 23 P.3d 653, 656–57 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2001) (construing “mentally incapable” to include intoxication, a temporary
impairment); Jackson v. State, 890 P.2d 587, 589 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (construing
“mentally incapable” to include a woman with mental retardation, a persistent impairment).
81 See, e.g., Reavis v. Solminski, 551 N.W.2d 528, 539 (Neb. 1996) (noting that the
criminal law analysis of consent is “equally applicable in tort law”); Wilson v. Tobiassen,
777 P.2d 1379, 1384 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that incapacity under criminal statutes
extends to civil cases); C.C.H. v. Philadelphia Phillies, Inc., 940 A.2d 336, 339 (Pa. 2008)
(“[E]vidence of the victim’s consent to sexual contact, like in criminal proceedings, is not
an available defense in determining a defendant’s civil liability.”).
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through legal tests. For the temporary extended incapacity of minors, this is an
easy task, as all states have adopted a bright-line age of consent rule for sexual
activity, typically set between sixteen or eighteen years of age.82 The brightline age of consent rule embodies multiple policy aims, such as preventing
those who lack mental capacity from making unwise decisions and protecting
individuals from coercion, whereas these doctrines are unbundled for adults.83
This treatment of sexual incapacity for minors is justified by the fact that the
age of consent rule represents only a temporary disability, and everyone will
eventually outgrow the incapacity.84 It is also highly administrable, as it only
requires evidence of age.85
For adults, sexual incapacity is considered as a separate doctrine, which is
typically more standard-like in form.86 A key feature of many states’ legal
tests is that they focus narrowly on the mental capacities of the subject. At the
most basic level, these tests require that an individual have the capacity to
understand that there is a decision to be made and that she has the ability to
say yes or no, to consent or not.87 Beyond this, tests vary. Some are relatively
underdeveloped, focusing simply on evidence of disability88 or on whether a
82 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(A) (2010) (eighteen); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.50(b) (West Supp. 2015) (seventeen); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.364(6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (sixteen). The picture is complicated slightly by
“Romeo and Juliet” exceptions in many states, which permit sex between minors or
between minors and adults who are close in age. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632A:3(II) (Supp. 2014) (permitting sexual relations with someone aged 13–16 if within four
years of age); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13, § 3252(c)(2) (2009) (permitting sexual relations
between individuals aged fifteen to nineteen). Some states have also adopted marital
exceptions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a) (West 2014) (“Unlawful sexual
intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the
spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor.”). In these cases, the court merely has to
ascertain the ages or marital status of the sexual partners in question.
83 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
22, 58–59 (1992) (noting how rules captures background policies imperfectly while
standards apply them directly).
84 See ARCHARD, supra note 59, at 116.
85 See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 58 (“A legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it binds a
decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering
facts.”). Whether or not this form of the rule is correct or desirable is beyond the scope of
this Article, but if states were to depart from such a bright-line rule, this Article’s analysis
of the appropriate legal test might prove useful. See generally Joseph J. Fischel, Per Se or
Power? Age and Sexual Consent, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 279, 311 (2010) (providing
helpful analysis of some of these age-of-consent issues).
86 See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 58 (“A legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it
tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background
principle or policy to a fact situation.”).
87 See, e.g., In re David K., No. 1 CA-JV 08-0182, 2009 WL 1606018, at *1 (Ariz. Ct.
App. June 9, 2009) (showing the court’s discomfort with the victim’s inability to express
discontent).
88 See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 381 So. 2d 1019, 1021–22 (Miss. 1980) (“Here, the
proof shows without contradiction that the victim was mentally incapable of consenting to
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person can exercise “judgment.”89 In states with more developed tests, courts
tend to analyze whether an individual has the ability to understand the nature
and consequences of sexual activity.90 Courts typically group consequences
into physical and nonphysical categories.91 The physical consequences include
the possibility of pleasurable sexual release, pregnancy, or sexually
transmitted diseases. Nonphysical consequences consist of the potential
feelings of mental pleasure or displeasure from the sexual encounter, mental
consequences for one’s sense of self, or social consequences in the form of
changes in the nature of relationships with others.
New York has adopted a broad test for determining capacity, requiring the
ability “to appraise the sexual act, its significance and its consequences,”
including consideration of the “‘moral quality’ of the act as it would be
measured by society.”92 This incorporates moral consequences into the test, an
approach that few courts have followed, often citing problems with the
vagueness of this standard.93 North Dakota’s case law is characteristic of a
more moderate and common approach, requiring that an individual
“understand the nature of the sexual act as well as its consequences such as
pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases but not the moral nature of their
participation in the act of intercourse.”94
sexual intercourse.”); State v. Burks, 267 S.E.2d 752, 753 (W. Va. 1980) (merely repeating
the statutory language stating that someone who is “mentally defective or mentally
incapacitated” cannot consent).
89 See Ely v. State, 384 S.E.2d 268, 271–72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (declaring “a female
victim, who due to the degree of mental retardation suffered, is incapable of giving an
intelligent assent or dissent and to exercise judgment”); State v. Willenbring, 454 N.W.2d
268, 270 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (repeating the statutory language requiring “judgment to
give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or to sexual penetration”).
90 Note that capacity does not require actual knowledge of the consequences of sex; it
just requires the capacity to process whatever these consequences might be. Of course,
whether one has actual knowledge may be relevant to the inquiry into whether one has the
capacity to acquire such knowledge. See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, No. 99AP-819, 2000 WL
675042, at *6–7 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 2000) (finding probative the victim’s lack of
understanding of social mores).
91 For another typology, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 111
(1992), categorizing the consequences as “procreative, hedonistic, and sociable.”
92 People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1333 (N.Y. 1977); see also People v. Cox, 709
N.W.2d 152, 156 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (noting as relevant that the victim could not
understand the repercussions of engaging in homosexual acts with the perpetrator); People
v. Breck, 584 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (“We find persuasive, and therefore
adopt, the reasoning contained in the Easley decision and hold that the statutory language
in question is meant to encompass not only an understanding of the physical act but also an
appreciation of the nonphysical factors, including the moral quality of the act, that
accompany such an act.”).
93 See State v. Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Iowa 1980) (striking down as
unconstitutionally vague a statute requiring “the mental capacity to know the right and
wrong of conduct in sexual matters”).
94 State v. Mosbrucker, 758 N.W.2d 663, 667 (N.D. 2008).
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The nature and consequences test has its conceptual merits, especially in
its application to situations of temporary transient incapacity.95 In those
situations, it serves to protect a baseline non-impaired self (who will reemerge)
against sexual exploitation by others while one is in a temporarily altered
mental state.96 Because of the relatively short duration of the incapacity in that
context, the restriction on sexual opportunities is relatively minor. In contrast,
people with persistent incapacity may face lifetime restrictions on sexual
activity if their cognitive abilities are deemed inadequate. There is also no
non-impaired self who will reemerge to benefit from any restriction that is
placed on sexual activity.97 This result also has concrete effects on social and
95 This is not to say that the test is without its problems. First, the level of incapacity
at the time of the encounter is often difficult to assess because the incapacitating condition
wears off, often before incapacity can be evaluated. See Sharon Cowan, The Trouble with
Drink: Intoxication, (In)capacity, and the Evaporation of Consent to Sex, 41 AKRON L.
REV. 899, 902 (2008) (reviewing methods of determining whether there is capacity to
consent in situations of intoxication). Second, many intoxication cases involve situations of
voluntary and mutual intoxication, and courts sometimes pick up on this contextual fact to
protect male defendants and disadvantage female complainants. See Karen M. Kramer,
Rule by Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related Acquaintance
Rapes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115 (1994) (“If the rapist was drunk, it reduces his
culpability, but if the victim was drunk, it increases her culpability.”). Scholars have
struggled with how to deal with these issues. See Falk, supra note 14, at 187–88 (arguing
for the intoxication to be specifically referenced in statutes and involuntary intoxication
and subsequent “rape by drugs” to be punished more severely); Christine Chambers
Goodman, Protecting the Party Girl: A New Approach for Evaluating Intoxicated Consent,
2009 BYU L. REV. 57, 86 (2009) (arguing for a sliding-scale notion of consent in
intoxicated encounters); Clare Carlson, Comment, “This Bitch Got Drunk and Did This to
Herself:” Proposed Evidentiary Reforms to Limit “Victim Blaming” and “Perpetrator
Pardoning” in Rape by Intoxication Trials in California, 29 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y
285, 308–10 (2014) (arguing for the inadmissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication
under California rules).
96 In fact, this reasoning derives from the traditional distinction at common law
between the lunatic, whose condition was temporary, and the idiot, whose condition was
lifelong and persistent. See Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the
Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 16–18 (1990) (describing how the
Crown was limited in its control over the lunatic’s property because if the lunatic regained
capacity, her property would have to be returned to her).
97 One could argue that a mitigating factor for those with persistent acquired
incapacity is that they already had sexual opportunities early in life. In other words, they
had their “fair innings.” See, e.g., Alan Williams, Intergenerational Equity: An Exploration
of the ‘Fair Innings’ Argument, 6 HEALTH ECON. 117, 129 (1997) (making this argument in
the allocation of health care). This argument is not valid in this context, for two reasons.
First, persistent acquired incapacity can strike at any age, even if it might affect older
adults more. This raises the question of where to draw the line of when one has achieved
sufficient sexual opportunities. Second, this argument is typically applied in situations of
scarce resources, when one has to trade off between two individuals who need the same
resource. Sexual opportunities are not limited resources in the same way, and allowing
more people sexual opportunities will actually have the effect of increasing potential sexual
partners for others.
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sexual norms. To the degree that a class of individuals is deemed to lack
sexual consent capacity, this can devalue them and construct them either as
asexual and undesirable or as hypersexual and in need of control.98
Thus, the nature and consequences test leads to undesirable outcomes in
two important contexts in which it is applied—persistent lifelong incapacity
and persistent acquired incapacity—creating the need for an alternative test for
persistent cognitive impairments. This problem has not gone unrecognized by
courts or in the legal scholarship, but the proposed solutions have their own
significant drawbacks. For example, in an attempt to get away from tests that
focus on the mental capacity to judge consequences, New Jersey follows a
“nature of the conduct” test, as expressed in State v. Olivio:
The cognitive capacity . . . involves the knowledge that the conduct is
distinctively sexual. In the context of this criminal statute, that knowledge
extends only to the physical or physiological aspects of sex; it does not
extend to an awareness that sexual acts have probable serious consequences,
such as pregnancy and birth, disease, infirmities, adverse psychological or
emotional disorders, or possible adverse moral or social effects.99

This is a rather minimal requirement of capacity, requiring volition but not
an understanding of the consequences of sex.100 This test would certainly
allow a wide range of sexual activity by people with persistent cognitive
impairments. However, it would place them at risk of significant welfare
threats by permitting sexual activity merely if they said “yes,” even if they had
no capacity to understand the consequences of the decision, such as pregnancy
or sexually transmitted diseases.
Instead of narrowing the sexual incapacity inquiry to mere volition, many
scholars have instead suggested widening the inquiry beyond the mental
capacities of the subject when looking at persistent cognitive impairments.
98 See Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues

and Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 97, 118–24 (1994) (discussing the
history of “asexual objectification”); see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination:
The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1325 (2009)
(discussing the hypersexualization of people with disabilities); Ralph Sandland, Sex and
Capacity: The Management of Monsters?, 76 MODERN L. REV. 981, 982–83 (2013)
(discussing how the “animal instincts” doctrine painted females with cognitive
impairments as dangerous).
99 State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 604–05 (N.J. 1991).
100 It is not entirely clear how many courts, including in New Jersey, actually follow
this approach. The statutory language in many states includes the term “nature of the
conduct,” but few seem to follow Olivio explicitly, and some adopt a nature and
consequences test in spite of more limited statutory language. See State v. Mosbrucker, 758
N.W.2d 663, 667 (N.D. 2008) (creating a nature and consequences test despite having
“nature of his or her conduct” language in the relevant statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-2003(1)(e)); People v. Whitten, 647 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (same, although
creating a totality of the circumstances test instead); Denno, supra note 15, at 345 n.188
(noting that other courts tend not to follow Olivio directly).
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Professor Deborah Denno’s test is emblematic and the most prominent of
these approaches.101 Her “contextual approach” would assess not only the
intellectual capacities of the subject, but also the “factual, moral, and
contextual aspects of each case.”102 The inquiry would be guided by the
principle that people with persistent cognitive impairments should not be
judged by a higher consent standard than those without these impairments.103
This approach may be compatible with the case law of certain states, such as
Illinois, which has adopted a broad “totality of the circumstances” test for
sexual incapacity, allowing a consideration of a host of factors.104
This open-ended flight to context poses its own difficulties. Without
further specificity, all facts are potentially relevant to the capacity inquiry
under the contextual approach.105 The proffered limiting principle is helpful to
the extent that it prohibits blanket restrictions on sexual activity due just to
cognitive impairments, but it provides little guidance beyond that.106 This has
two negative effects. First, it provides no predictability to institutions that
house people with persistent incapacities about whether they will be exposed
to liability by permitting residents to engage in sexual activity. In fact, it may
create more uncertainty than the current regime, as it widens the factual
inquiry by the court. This will perhaps make institutions even more fearful of
liability and cause them to restrict sexual environments further.
Second, it delegates to the courts the task of sorting out what factual,
moral or contextual factors might be relevant to the capacity inquiry. Inviting
judges to make somewhat unrestricted normative judgments in the area of
capacity is a perilous endeavor, as the checkered history of incapacity
doctrines demonstrates.107 Putting judges in charge of sexual judgments will
serve to promote certain types of mainstream sexual relationships and
101 See Denno, supra note 15, at 355–56.
102 Id. at 359.
103 Id. at 355.
104 See Whitten, 647 N.E.2d at 1067.
105 The complexity of the decisional domain does not necessarily demand such an

open-ended test. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 586–96 (1992) (distinguishing complexity from the choice of a rule or
standard).
106 The limit on blanket restrictions seems to be the focus of this principle in Professor
Denno’s applications. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 15, at 369–70 (“By implicitly
presuming that Betty may not be able to consent to sexual intercourse under any
circumstances, the court’s ruling also ensured that she would be judged from a higher
consent standard than her nonretarded counterpart.”). Of course, one could argue that
people with cognitive impairments are de facto being held to a higher consent standard by
virtue of having their mental capacity evaluated by third parties at all. This further
reinforces the point that the principle provides insufficient guidance in application.
107 See Knauer, supra note 41, at 341–42 (noting that capacity doctrines have been
used to oppress various groups in society). See generally Susan Stefan, Silencing the
Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory and Law, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 763 (1993)
(arguing that capacity has been used as a way of obscuring the power differentials that
women face).
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practices over other, more deviant ones.108 In addition, the exercise of this
judicial authority to prohibit certain forms of sexual expression will typically
fall hardest on those with disfavored sexualities, such as women, racial
minorities, people with disabilities, older adults, and sexual minorities.109 In
short, some context is needed to escape the problems of the nature and
consequences test, but the contextual inquiry needs more structure to constrain
judges in their judgments and to make those judgments more predictable.110
108 See Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 281 (Carole S.
Vance ed., 1984) (describing how society typically divides up “good sex” and “bad sex”).
109 See MICHAEL GILL, ALREADY DOING IT: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND SEXUAL
AGENCY 17 (2015) (“Notions about the ability to be sexual are intertwined with gendered,
classed, and racialized assessments of fitness.”); Luke A. Boso, Urban Bias, Rural Sexual
Minorities, and the Courts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 562, 566 (2013) (describing how these
biases can disadvantage rural sexual minorities); Elaine Craig, Capacity to Consent to
Sexual Risk, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 103, 108–13 (2014) (arguing that avoiding normative
assessment of sex better serves women and sexual minorities); Helen Meekosha, Body
Battles: Bodies, Gender, and Disability, in THE DISABILITY READER 163, 173–78 (Tom
Shakespeare ed., 1998) (describing the regulation and surveillance of female disabled
bodies); Ruthann Robson, Judicial Review and Sexual Freedom, 30 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 19
(2007) (reviewing approaches critical of judicial methods of securing sexual freedom);
Michael B. Shortnacy, Sexual Minorities, Criminal Justice, and the Death Penalty, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 231, 231 (2005) (noting how such bias operates against sexual
minorities, undercutting other legal victories).
110 The contextual models of other scholars are subject to similar objections.
Professors Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, writing from the Canadian perspective,
propose that sexual capacity tests should focus on the contextual factors of the power
dynamics of the relationship, coercion, and voluntariness. See Janine Benedet & Isabel
Grant, Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental Disabilities:
Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief, 52 MCGILL L.J. 243, 279–87 (2007). While the
authors’ focus on combating sexual abuse of women with disabilities is laudable, their test
collapses the capacity and coercion inquiries, concentrating on the latter. This creates a
robust coercion doctrine, which is valuable, especially in abuse of trust cases where a
professional engages in sexual relations with a vulnerable client with disabilities. This
approach, however, fails to provide a positive account of when people with persistent
cognitive impairments can attain legal capacity and exercise their sexual capabilities. This
truncated understanding of capacity creates an opening for judges to impose their own
views about sexual morality in discriminatory ways.
Working in the context of adolescents, Professor Jennifer Ann Drobac has proposed
an intriguing sexual capacity standard of legal assent. This is a form of consent that is
voidable by the minor after the fact for tort law purposes if it is in the best interests of the
subject to do so, while at the same time maintaining the possibility of independent criminal
law prosecution. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science,
Teenagers, and the Sting to “the Age of Consent,” 20 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 113–15 (2011).
This test was developed in the context of the temporary extended incapacity of minority,
and it might be a poor fit for more persistent forms of incapacity. Delegating the contextual
analysis of “best interests” to the minor avoids the problem of judicial overreach, but a
regime of voidable consent provides little predictability for institutions, caregivers, or
sexual partners about how to proceed in the face of someone who has cognitive
impairments and sexual desires. In addition, it does not touch on criminal law doctrines,
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Part II defined the relevant terms for the argument in this Article and
described how the law operates to restrict sexual activity through the liability it
imposes and the social norms it reinforces. Finally, it set out the basic problem
with the dominant nature and consequences test: it overly restricts the sexual
lives of people living in contexts of persistent lifelong incapacity and
persistent acquired incapacity. The alternatives have their own problems. The
nature of the conduct test opens up the possibility of too many welfare threats,
and the contextual approach gives too much leeway to judges to decide the
sexual lives of people with disabilities and provides no predictability about
liability exposure. The next part lays the groundwork for reforming sexual
incapacity doctrine by evaluating the normative bases of the doctrine while
also examining the lived experiences of people with persistent incapacities.

III. NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS AND LIVED EXPERIENCES
The issues with adult sexual incapacity doctrines identified in Part II
derive from both theoretical and practical sources. The theoretical source is the
autonomy value that underlies and heavily influences the form of the current
doctrine.111 Cognitive capacity is cast as a necessary precondition of that
autonomy, and thus a legal test that solely inquires into the cognitive
capacities of the subject is seen as vindicating that value.112 This
understanding of autonomy has been critiqued for its exclusion of people who
do not fit the ideal mold of independent cognitively unimpaired agents.113
Thus, it is not surprising that the legal test that derives from that value is
which are often the biggest driver of restrictive sexual environments for people with
disabilities.
111 See, e.g., ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE
ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 36–40 (1990) (discussing the importance of selfdetermination to informed consent); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and
Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1771–77 (1992) (discussing the role of
autonomy in mental health law).
112 See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988)
(understanding autonomy as “a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon
their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or
attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values”); FEINBERG, supra
note 38, at 28 (describing autonomy as a capacity for self-government, which “is
determined by the ability to make rational choices, a qualification usually so interpreted as
to exclude infants, insane persons, the severely retarded, the senile, and the comatose, and
to include virtually everyone else”).
113 See, e.g., Eva Feder Kittay, The Ethics of Care, Dependence, and Disability, 24
RATIO JURIS. 49, 51 (2011) (“I want to suggest that an ethics that puts the autonomous
individual at the forefront, that eclipses the importance of our dependence on one
another, . . . is not one to be preferred in the construction of an ethics of inclusion . . . .”);
see also MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, GENDER, POLITICS 30–55 (2003) (summarizing
critiques of autonomy and suggesting a reconfiguration of the concept rather than a
wholesale rejection). One possibility for such a reconfiguration is the concept of relational
autonomy, explored infra Part III.B.
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subject to a similar critique. This creates a need for a new normative basis for
the doctrine that is inclusive of people with persistent cognitive
impairments.114
The practical source of the problem is the fact that the adult sexual
incapacity doctrine is not calibrated for the variety of situations in which it is
applied. These include both temporary transient incapacities like intoxication
as well as persistent incapacities such as Down Syndrome and dementia. The
decision-making contexts for persistent lifelong and persistent acquired
incapacity are different, as they lack the quality of a reemerging self with
mental capacity and often involve decision-making with the assistance of
others. Any test of sexual incapacity that applies to these two contexts should
take into account the lived experiences of people in those situations.
This Part endeavors to address these theoretical and practical problems.
Part A argues that the primary theoretical basis for sexual incapacity doctrines
should be sexual capability, an inclusive alternative to sexual autonomy that
still protects the historical importance of self-determination in the doctrine.
Part B discusses the concept and practice of supported decision-making, the
context in which many people with persistent cognitive impairments live their
lives and practice self-determination. Understanding this lived experience
generates the insight that self-determination, often cast as autonomy, is
relational in nature.

A. Sexual Capability
The capabilities approach in economics and philosophy is a view of living
as a combination of functionings, which are a series of “doings” and
“beings.”115 These “doings” and “beings” are the various activities that one
could engage in, or the various states of being that one could achieve.116
Examples of doing functionings include voting in an election, taking care of a
child, or eating a nutritious meal. Examples of being functionings are being
healthy, being educated, or being happy. A capability represents the ability to
pursue these functionings, and one’s global well-being is based on whether
one can achieve functionings that are valuable, like sex and sexuality.117
114 See Milton D. Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency,

38 MICH. L. REV. 1189, 1205 (1940) (arguing for the importance of understanding the
substantive policies that underlie capacity doctrine).
115 See Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS
270, 270–93 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3rd ed. 2008); see also AMARTYA SEN,
COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 25–32 (1985).
116 See SEN, supra note 17, at 39.
117 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 78 (2000)
(considering the capability to pursue “opportunities for sexual satisfaction” as one of the
central human capabilities necessary for a flourishing life); SEN, supra note 17, at 40
(“Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to
lead one type of life or another.”).
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I define the value of sexual capability as the opportunity to pursue
functionings associated with sex and sexuality.118 This could include having
sexual pleasure, forming a sexual identity, or feeling sexy. The opportunities
to achieve such functionings are not unlimited. In particular, one must respect
the sexual capabilities of others.119 This justifies the requirement of consent, as
it preserves the ability of others to make their own sexual choices.120 Consent
is also important because having sex without consent—i.e., experiencing
rape—creates a host of other severely negative welfare effects, as the
expansive literature on rape has documented.121 This can affect not only your
own sexual capability but other human capabilities that are important.122
The focus of sexual capability is on ensuring opportunities rather than on
guaranteeing happiness, economic resources, or freedom from state
interference.123 However, capability can overlap significantly with these other
measures of well-being. For example, a society that socializes its citizens to
think that sex is dirty, that criminalizes non-marital sexual conduct, and that
provides no protections against sexual violence, denies its citizens the
capability for a healthy sexual life. Its citizens may also be less likely to be
118 While Nussbaum categorizes sexual satisfaction as a part of the fundamental
capability of bodily integrity, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 117, at 78, it could also be a part
of other fundamental capabilities, such as senses, imagination, and thought, emotions,
practical reason, affiliation, and play. See id. at 78-80; see also DON KULICK & JENS
RYDSTRÖM, LONELINESS AND ITS OPPOSITE 286 (2015) (connecting a right to sex with the
fundamental capabilities of bodily integrity, emotions, and affiliation).
119 This is a key facet of liberal political theory. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 8–10 (1980); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 191–92 (1985); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 325–28 (1971). But see
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 107–62 (1986); Edward L. Rubin, Nazis, Skokie,
and the First Amendment as Virtue, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 233, 255 (1986) (“The progressive
critique of classical, your-rights-end-at-my-nose liberalism is based precisely on the idea of
social interdependence, and a vision of institutions that change continuously over time to
provide individuals with increasingly greater rights and opportunities.”).
120 Consent is best understood as “both a subjective decision and a social act.” Emily
Sherwin, Infelicitous Sex, 2 LEGAL THEORY 209, 216 (1996). This social act has great
power, which derives from personhood. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent,
2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 123 (1996) (“[C]onsent can function to transform the morality of
another’s conduct—to make an action right when it would otherwise be wrong. For
example, consent turns a trespass into a dinner party; a battery into a handshake; a theft
into a gift; an invasion of privacy into an intimate moment; a commercial appropriation of
name and likeness into a biography.”).
121 See, e.g., Rebecca Campbell et al., An Ecological Model of the Impact of Sexual
Assault on Women’s Mental Health, 10 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 225 (2009)
(describing the long-term negative effects of rape); Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes
Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 193 (1987–88) (describing rape as “negation
of existence”); Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1448 (1993) (comparing rape to “spiritual murder”).
122 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY,
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 76–78 (2006) (providing a list of ten central human capabilities).
123 See Sen, supra note 115, at 271.
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happy. Even if society does provide all that is necessary for a healthy sexual
life, individual members of that society might, however, still pursue unhealthy
sexual relationships or deny themselves sexual partners altogether, despite the
desire for them. In other words, they might not take advantage of the
opportunities to which they have access. Ultimately, it is the right of each
individual to decide whether to pursue the functionings that are within
reach.124 Perhaps other functionings are perceived to be more important, or
other commitments required sacrifices in the realm of sex and sexuality. In this
way, sexual capability is agnostic as to peoples’ sexual choices, as the focus is
on creating the ability to have meaningful choice.125
This points to a minimum threshold of capacity that should be required by
any legal test embodying sexual capability: the ability to express volition. In
other words, if one is so cognitively impaired that one cannot express
affirmative desire with respect to sexual opportunities, then one cannot be a
sexual agent.126 This requirement of the ability to express will or intention
represents a basic threshold that one must cross before one can be deemed
capable of sexual consent.127 This is a relatively minimal threshold, but it is
necessary, not only to establish sexual consent in the first place, but also
because it the only way to know what a person’s internal mental states
regarding sexual desires might be.128
A given person’s capabilities are a “product of her internal endowments,
her external resources, and the social and physical environment in which she
lives.”129 For example, in order to have the ability to drive to work, one must
possess physical and mental capacities to drive, the resources to buy a vehicle
to transport oneself, the legal entitlement of a driver’s license, and adequately
paved roads to get from point A to point B. This reflects the understanding that
124 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 122, at 171–73.
125 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., COMPETENCE IN THE LAW 296–97 (2008) (“First, as

a society, we accept the fact that persons without mental disabilities are free to make
terrible decisions all the time without governmental or judicial intervention. . . . Yet, we
have a different view with regard to the decision-making autonomy and capability of
persons with mental disabilities. Why is that?” (footnote omitted)).
126 See Robert Audi, Volition, Intention, and Responsibility, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1675,
1680 (1994) (discussing the importance of volition as acts of will or as playing an
“executory role in action”).
127 See Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 57, 67 (2012) (noting that volition is one of the necessary
components of consent).
128 See Donald Dripps, For a Negative, Normative Model of Consent, with a Comment
on Preference-Skepticism, 2 LEGAL THEORY 113, 114 (1996) (“[C]onsent, is, at least in
part, either a psychological state or some conduct that is presumed to provide evidence of a
psychological state.”); Drobac, supra note 110, at 80 (discussing the necessity of volition
to both legal consent and assent).
129 Elizabeth Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice, in MEASURING
JUSTICE: PRIMARY GOODS AND CAPABILITIES 81, 96 (Harry Brighouse & Ingrid Robeyns
eds., 2010).
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capabilities are not just a product of cognitive factors.130 For example, sexual
capability is the product of various factors, including one’s cognitive
impairments, social resources, and the legal treatment of those impairments
and resources. Disability theorists have long emphasized that disabilities are
not only created by the physical or mental impairments of the individual, but
also by a society that refuses to accommodate these impairments.131 Put
another way, the source of disability should be located both externally and
internally.132
This is where the distinction between mental and legal capacity is helpful.
The former represents the cognitive capacities of the subject, and the latter
represents how the law interprets those capacities.133 To the extent that the law
only considers mental capacities in evaluating legal capacity, it deprives many
people with cognitive impairments of legal capacity. In the realm of sexuality,
this has the effect of cutting people with persistent cognitive impairments off
from this important aspect of the human experience. In other words, the legal
doctrine can be a source of disability for people with cognitive impairments if
it focuses narrowly on their mental capacities.
Sexual capability overlaps significantly with the value of sexual autonomy
in its emphasis on self-determination. Whereas autonomy focuses on
possessing the cognitive faculties to make choice, capability is more focused
on creating the conditions necessary for self-determination, both internal and
external to the subject. This more holistic understanding of self-determination
makes the value inclusive of people with persistent cognitive impairments, but
it does not represent a huge departure from the traditional normative bases of
the sexual incapacity doctrines. This maintains doctrinal coherence with the

130 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 70–71 (2000) (describing the
various heterogeneities in these different variables that contribute to overall capability).
131 See, e.g., MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL
APPROACH 11 (1990); Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and the Environment, 23 J.
SOC. PHIL. 105, 110 (1992) (“A handicap results from the interaction between a disability
and an environment . . . .”). But see Anita Silvers, An Essay on Modeling: The Social
Model of Disability, in PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 19, 19–21 (D.
Christopher Ralston & Justin Ho eds., 2010) (critiquing the social model of disability for
not representing the subjective and varied nature of the lived experience of people with
disabilities).
132 See Lennart Nordenfelt, Ability, Competence, and Qualification: Fundamental
Concepts in the Philosophy of Disability, in PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY,
supra note 131, at 37, 39 (“Thus, there is no such thing as ability in isolation. And there is
no such thing as an opportunity in isolation. A person’s ability must be judged in light of a
certain set of circumstances. And a person’s opportunity must be judged in the light of a
certain set of conditions internal to his or her body or mind.”).
133 See Charles P. Sabatino, Competency: Refining Our Legal Fictions, in OLDER
ADULTS’ DECISION-MAKING AND THE LAW 1, 2–4 (Michael Smyer et al. eds., 1996)
(referring to legal capacity determinations as legal fictions).
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interconnected legal regimes governing consent and sexual assault, which are
premised to a large degree on the sexual autonomy value.134
Like sexual autonomy, sexual capability is valuable not only because of
the opportunity it represents to forge a sexual self, but also because it
indirectly protects sexual welfare, or the effects of sex that contribute to wellbeing.135 The welfare associated with sexual activity derives, first, from the
subjective mental states that are involved in sex. These mental states are
important because of the largely subjective nature of sex.136 The first sense in
which sex is subjective is that what is actually “sexual” will differ wildly
between people and contexts.137 Consider the recent controversy over the artist
Sia’s music video for her song, “Elastic Heart.”138 In it, Shia LaBoeuf, a 28year old male actor, performs an interpretive dance shirtless with Maddie
Ziegler, a 12-year old dancer, who wears a full-body nude-colored costume.
Sia intended and saw the dance as nonsexual; it represented a battle between
two “Sia self-states.”139 The outcry was immediate from fans, however, who
considered the video to be sexualizing children and valorizing pedophilia,
134 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[Rape] is
highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal
integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the latter’s privilege of choosing those
with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the
‘ultimate violation of self.’” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION REPORT, RAPE AND ITS VICTIMS 1 (1975))); STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 99 (1998). There are, of course, dissenting voices. See
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 81–93 (1987) (arguing that systems of
societal coercion render consent suspect); Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency:
Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 806 (1999)
(arguing for sexual agency); Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the
Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1425–27 (2013) (arguing for selfpossession).
135 See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 111, at 9–36 (discussing the importance of
the value of well-being to the analysis of incapacity); Larry Alexander, Pursuing the
Good—Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315, 315 (1985) (discussing Mill’s views on the relationship
between libertarianism and utilitarianism).
136 See ABRAMSON & PINKERTON, supra note 30, at 8–10 (describing the subjective
nature of sexual pleasure); see also Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 149,
185 (2000).
137 See Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1139, 1146–47
(1998) (discussing whether the ritualized fellatio between Sambian males should be
considered sexual or erotic); id. at 1157–58 (discussing whether the sodomy of Abner
Louima by New York City police should be considered a sex crime).
138 Sia, Elastic Heart feat. Shia LaBeouf & Maddie Ziegler (Official Video), YOUTUBE
(Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KWZGAExj-es [http://perma.cc/
EB5B=J3M5].
139 See Kory Grow, Sia Apologizes for Controversial ‘Elastic Heart’ Video with Shia
Labeouf, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/siaapologizes-for-controversial-elastic-heart-video-with-shia-labeouf-20150108 [http://perma.cc/
ZCW2-2T46].
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given the identities of the two performers and the juxtaposition of their bodies
in a certain configuration.140 What is sexual for one person might not be
sexual for another.
Sex is also highly subjective in a second sense. Even when there is
consensus about what is considered sexual, two people might disagree about
whether some activity deemed sexual is desirable.141 This is the case with
respect to sexual partners—neither a heterosexual male nor a lesbian will
likely find sex with a male desirable. This is also the case with respect to
sexual activities. Some people get off on being sexual exhibitionists, while
others find the thought terrifying. Even within individuals, there may be a mix
of emotions and desires with respect to a given sexual activity with a given
partner.142 Thus, from an outside perspective, there is no clear and objective
way to determine what is “good sex” and “bad sex.” Delegating sexual
decisions to the individual represents the understanding that the individual is
in the best position to perform their own sexual welfare calculus.143
While sexual welfare might primarily be subjective, this subjectivity
breaks down somewhat when we think of the physical consequences of sex.
There are certain physical effects of sexual decisions, such as pregnancy and
sexually transmitted diseases, which are knowable to third parties and
quantifiable by medical professionals. These physical effects are also strongly
related to other fundamental human capabilities such as life and bodily
health.144 Health occupies a special place in the capabilities framework, which
warrants special attention to the health-related consequences of sexual
expression.145 The interpretation of these physical effects may still vary—
140 See id.
141 See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 7 (1999) (“Having an ethics

of sex, therefore, does not mean having a theory about what people’s desires are or should
be. If the goal is sexual autonomy, then it will be impossible to say in advance what form
that will take.”); see also EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 25–26
(2008) (noting the various and radical ways in which sexuality differs in its subjective
meaning for individuals).
142 See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM 301–02 (2006) (“I think most of us experience sex (when it’s not routinized) as
an alarming mix of desire and fear, delight and disgust, power and surrender, surrender and
power, attachment and alienation, ecstasy in the root sense of the word and enmired
embodiedness.”).
143 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 55 (David Spitz, ed., W.W. Norton & Co.
1975) (1859) (“But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the
maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for him to
find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances
and character.”).
144 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 122, at 76 (“1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a
human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to
be not worth living. 2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including
reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.”).
145 See CHRISTOPHER A. RIDDLE, DISABILITY AND JUSTICE 77–85 (2014) (arguing for
the primacy of health in the ordering of capabilities).
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imagine the contrasting reactions to an unwanted pregnancy and a pregnancy
that results from several months of actively seeking that result. However, in
situations of mental incapacity, there might be no clear understanding or
interpretation of these physical effects from the individual with cognitive
impairments. In these cases, there may be a role for third-party evaluation of
such risks to protect the individual from welfare threats.146
The third parties most likely to assist people with persistent cognitive
impairments in their decision-making are their supportive networks. The next
Part explores how many people with disabilities live in these capabilityenhancing networks, which are unrecognized by the law in this area.

B. Supported Decision-Making and Relational Autonomy
Social supports play an important role in enabling people with cognitive
impairments to exercise decision-making. In particular, people with persistent
cognitive impairments can and often do exercise decision-making potential
through supportive decision-making networks.147 Supported decision-making
is an emerging concept and formal practice, characterized by a situation in
which “an individual with cognitive challenges is the ultimate decision-maker
but is provided support from one or more persons who explain issues to the
individual and, where necessary, interpret the individual’s words and behavior
to determine his or her preferences.”148
These networks can consist of a single caregiver, a set of family members,
or an institution’s staff. The type of support provided will vary in accordance
with the impairments the network is helping address. First, there are supports
that “assist in formulating one’s purposes, to explore the range of choices and
to make a decision.”149 This involves communicating with the individual with
cognitive impairments to discern what her sexual desires are and helping her
make the connections between those interests and potential choices. If the
person lacks the ability to communicate verbally, then this may involve
observing the individual in context and paying attention to subtle cues of
desire or displeasure.150
146 Such third-party evaluation of welfare threats might also be warranted for certain
types of social consequences as well, if the subject cannot logically connect her actions to
such consequences, but will still profoundly feel their effects.
147 See Sara Honn Qualls, Decision-Making Capacity: The Players, in CHANGES IN
DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY IN OLDER ADULTS, supra note 37, at 109, 109–18 (describing
the different “players” that assist in decision-making).
148 Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to
Guardianship?, 117 PA. ST. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (2013).
149 MICHAEL BACH & LANA KERZNER, A NEW PARADIGM FOR PROTECTING AUTONOMY
AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL CAPACITY 73 (Oct. 2010), http://www.lco-cdo.org/
disabilities/bach-kerzner.pdf [http://perma.cc/TL55-68JM].
150 See Stanley S. Herr, Self-Determination, Autonomy, and Alternatives for
Guardianship, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES:
DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 429, 431–35 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003) (describing the
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Second, there are “supports to engage in the decision-making process with
other parties.”151 This primarily involves communicative support, as people
with cognitive impairments may have special forms of communicating their
desires and concerns. Research on people with profound disabilities has shown
that they are often capable of communication with the assistance of partners
who know them and their methods well.152 Such persons can act as
interpreters, just as a foreign language interpreter would for others.153
Third, there are “supports to act on the decisions that one has made.”154
This involves actualizing the decision, which may require arrangements for the
sexual expression in question. This could include creating a safe space to
engage in sexual expression, ensuring that the person with cognitive
impairment is not at risk for physical harm. It may also require the creation of
a private space for sexual expression, to the extent possible without
compromising the physical safety of the person with cognitive impairments.155
Supported decision-making broadens our understanding of the decisionmaking apparatus and of personhood from the individual and her body to the
individual nested in a series of relationships that facilitate meaningful
decision-making and flourishing.156 It is also a recognition and exercise of
relational autonomy.157 As several feminist theorists have pointed out, our
system in Sweden, which appoints a “god man,” who acts as an assistant to the person with
disabilities); Israel Doron, Elder Guardianship Kaleidoscope—A Comparative Legal
Perspective, 16 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 368, 376 (2002) (describing the “hojonin,” or
helper, in Japan for those who suffer from milder forms of intellectual disability, and with
whom various decisions are jointly made with the ward).
151 See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 149, at 73.
152 See STEVEN CARNABY, PEOPLE WITH PROFOUND AND MULTIPLE LEARNING
DISABILITIES: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH ABOUT THEIR LIVES 9–10 (2004) (summarizing the
approaches and results of several studies); see also MALCOLM GOLDSMITH, HEARING THE
VOICE OF PEOPLE WITH DEMENTIA 56–59 (1996) (discussing communication strategies for
individuals with dementia); Karen Bunning, Making Sense of Communication, in
PROFOUND INTELLECTUAL AND MULTIPLE DISABILITIES: NURSING COMPLEX NEEDS 46, 46
(Jillian Pawlyn & Steven Carnaby eds., 2009).
153 See, e.g., Nancy M. Maurer, Facilitated Communication: Can Children with Autism
Have a Voice in Court?, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 233, 248 (1995) (exploring the
legal issues involved in facilitated communication for people with autism).
154 See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 149, at 73.
155 See Kristine S. Knaplund, The Right of Privacy and America’s Aging Population,
86 DENV. U. L. REV. 439, 442 (2009) (discussing the tension between sexual expression
and privacy).
156 See KULICK & RYDSTRÖM, supra note 118, at 16 (“If I need other people’s
assistance to eat, dress, make lunch, scratch my itchy nose, convey meaning through my
monosyllabic vocalizations, and engage in sexual relations with my equally disabled
partner, then the locus of my personhood is dispersed—it resides not in my body, but
across a network of relations that need to get coordinated in order to allow me to flourish as
an individual.”).
157 See Marilyn Friedman, Relational Autonomy and Independence, in AUTONOMY,
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 42, 42 (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014) (defining
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sense of self and autonomy is experienced and interpreted relationally.158 As
children, we construct a sense of self in relation to our parents or other loved
ones who might surround us.159 They help us to develop our capacities for
individuality and choice, and this process continues as we age. Consider the
example of student autonomy in a classroom. How a teacher structures a
classroom impacts that autonomy, including the capacity for critical thinking:
Classes can be structured so that students are expected to memorize material
from lectures and texts and to parrot back professors’ views on exams. Class
discussion can encourage respectful disagreement among students and with
the professor or it can be characterized by harsh criticism or failure to take
alternative views seriously. . . . Again, the power hierarchy (and the students’
dependence on the professor for grades) remains. The question is whether it is
structured to create relations conducive to autonomy.160

Thus, our social relationships can enhance the exercise of our autonomy or
hinder it. We may enter the classroom with a set of mental capacities that will
either thrive or wither, depending on the social environment. This basic
dynamic is true of people with cognitive impairments as well, whose more
limited cognitive capacities will either thrive or wither depending on the
circumstances.
Thus, we must rely on others to exercise our autonomy. This dependency,
however, can come in two different forms. Some degree of dependency is a
necessary feature of the human condition.161 For example, as children,
everyone has undeveloped capacities for rational thought that must be
nurtured, and everyone is at risk of becoming disabled, whether by accident or
disease. Some amount of dependency, however, is “rooted in unjust and
potentially remediable social institutions.”162 This type of surplus dependency
relational autonomy as “emphasizing the social nature of the self and the social relations
and conditions that are necessary for the realization of autonomy”).
158 See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF,
AUTONOMY, AND LAW 3 (2011) (“The individual self is, then, constituted in an ongoing,
dynamic way by the relationships through which each person interacts with others.”);
Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Refigured, in RELATIONAL
AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 3, 3–
31 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000) (summarizing the different feminist
critiques of autonomy while arguing for a reconfiguration, rather than abandonment, of the
concept for feminist theory).
159 See Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 317, 329–32 (2007) (describing identity formation among children).
160 See NEDELSKY, supra note 158, at 40.
161 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 18 (2000) (“All
of us were dependent as children, and many of us will be dependent as we age, become ill,
or suffer disabilities.”).
162 Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, “Dependency” Demystified: Inscriptions of Power
in a Keyword of the Welfare State, 1 SOC. POL. 4, 24 (1994).
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inhibits capability, and often is the result of unjust laws or allocations of
resources. Fortunately, it is likewise amenable to reform through legal or
policy interventions.
In order for the adult sexual incapacity doctrine to realize the possibility of
sexual capability, it must recognize the existence of supportive decisionmaking networks.163 The law should recognize an individual who employs a
supported decision-making network as having legal capacity on par with
individuals who do not need such support.164 This will serve to remove one of
the disabling features of the social environment for people with disabilities,
and it will have the added benefit of bringing the law in line with international
law norms in this area.165






This Part first identified the sources of the problems with the dominant
approach to adult sexual incapacity doctrine. The first problem is a theoretical
one, as current doctrine rests on a narrow understanding of self-determination
embodied by a non-relational autonomy value. The second problem is a
practical one, as current doctrine does not take account of the decision-making
structures of people with persistent cognitive impairments. The Part then
proceeded to provide a stronger normative basis for sexual incapacity
doctrine—sexual capability—which accounts for the internal as well as
163 See Terry Carney, Participation and Service Access Rights for People with
Intellectual Disability: A Role for Law?, 38 J. INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY 59,
60 (2013) (noting that these structures already exist, waiting to be recognized by the law);
Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness—A Legal and Appropriate
Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 307 (2011).
164 See Nandini Devi, Supported Decision-Making and Personal Autonomy for
Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 792, 800–03 (2013) (describing more
generally the range of decision-making statuses that people with disabilities could occupy).
165 See U.N. Secretary-General, Final Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a
Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of
the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, art. 12(2), U.N. Doc. A/61/611 (Dec. 6,
2006), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N06/645/30/PDF/N0664530.pdf?
OpenElement [http://perma.cc/X8MD-2EBJ] (“States Parties shall recognize that persons
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”);
Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from
Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2, 8 (2012) (suggesting
a move to supported decision-making may be necessary); Eilionóir Flynn & Anna ArsteinKerslake, The Support Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, Fiction, or Fantasy?, 32 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 124 (2014) (arguing that only supported decision-making models are
permissible under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Article 12).
But see Sheila Wildeman, Challenges to Global Mental Health Policy in Light of the
Conventions on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 48, 58
(2013) (describing CRPD Article 12 as a skeletal attack on the existing regime of capacity,
without necessarily having plausible alternatives yet).
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external threats to self-determination. It then went on to discuss the role of
supportive networks in assisting those with persistent cognitive impairments in
pursuing decision-making, reflecting the relational nature of autonomy. The
next Part operationalizes the insights of this Part, describing what an adult
sexual incapacity doctrine informed by these insights might look like.

IV. COGNITION-PLUS
The cognition-plus test represents the legal implementation of the sexual
capability value for people with persistent cognitive impairments. It derives its
name from a joint focus on the mental capacities of the subject (cognition) and
the recognition that some individuals achieve sexual decision-making capacity
through the assistance of a decision-making support network (plus). The test
proceeds in three general steps. The first step is to gauge whether the
individual has the threshold capacity to express volition with respect to a
sexual decision. Without this manifestation of desire, one cannot proceed to be
a sexual agent. If the first step is satisfied, the second step is to assess whether
the individual has the necessary mental capacities to understand and reason
about the nature and consequences of a given sexual decision. If one meets this
requirement, then one has sexual consent capacity without the need for
assistance. If one does not, however, the third step is to evaluate whether there
is an adequate decision-making support network in place. Assessment of the
system would be contextual in nature, guided by the principles of loyalty and
care from fiduciary law. Thus, courts would evaluate whether the system is
free from conflicts of interest, has adequate knowledge of the individual and
the sexual decision, and has taken reasonable steps to protect the individual
with cognitive impairments from the threat of sexually transmitted diseases
and pregnancy. If the system is adequate, then the individual possesses sexual
consent capacity.
Part A discusses the key features of the test, compares it to the other
approaches discussed in Part II, and notes its limitations. Part B applies the test
to the case of older people with dementia, a group that has received little
attention in legal scholarship.

A. The Cognition-Plus Test
1. The Three-Step Legal Test
The first step of the cognition-plus test is to examine whether an
individual with persistent cognitive impairments still has the capacity to
express volition. This volition is traditionally expressed as verbally saying
“Yes” to sex. People with cognitive impairments, however, may have
difficulty with standard communication. In this case, volition might be inferred
in a variety of ways, which will often be specific to the person. It might come
in the form of initiation and active pursuit of sexual expression. Alternatively,
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it might require an interpretation of cues by someone familiar with the
person’s communication methods, which could include nonverbal signals or
facial expressions.166 If one is not capable of even this basic level of
communication of volition, then one lacks the legal capacity for sexual
consent. In this case, liability should flow to her sexual partner or to
institutions that have a responsibility for safeguarding her.
The second step is to assess the variety of cognitive abilities that one
might need to reason about a given sexual decision and its consequences. At a
minimum, this requires an understanding that the person has the power to
make a choice, to consent or not. Beyond this, the capacity to understand and
judge consequences is necessary to perform a subjective welfare calculus for
oneself. Thus, at an abstract level, the set of consequences of sex that one
should have the capacity to understand should start large, encompassing both
its physical and nonphysical effects. This starting point is justified by the fact
that sex has many meanings and many effects, any of which might be relevant
to a given decision-maker. One might want to achieve pleasure with sex, forge
a specific identity, solidify social relationships with others, or all of the
above.167
This relatively large set of consequences must then be calibrated to the
particular sexual situation. In other words, because capacity is determined on a
functional basis, one must consider each sexual decision at a particular point in
time under a particular set of circumstances. Physical and nonphysical
consequences vary significantly with sexual behavior; thus, the type and
quantity of consequences that one must be capable of understanding should
vary as well. For example, holding hands and kissing do not involve
significant risks of negative physical consequences, while penile-vaginal
166 See, e.g., People v. Miranda, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315, 339 (Ct. App. 2011) (“A person

can have the ability to give consent even though he or she responds to questions with one
or two-word answers and with physical gestures.”).
167 This set of consequences, however, should not include the “moral” consequences of
sex, as required by the New York test. First, it is not clear that there is a consensus on the
moral quality of different sexual acts in society, making a determination of that consensus
an impossible cognitive task. Some states have rejected the morality test precisely because
of this vagueness problem. See State v. Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Iowa 1980)
(striking down as unconstitutionally vague a statute requiring “the mental capacity to know
the right and wrong of conduct in sexual matters”). Second, since sexual activities are often
more private than other activities, the moral views of society as a whole would not be a
relevant consequence for most individuals engaged in sexual relations. See Anderson v.
Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1043 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the state
surely has a very strong, legitimate interest in ensuring that the consent of a mentally
disabled individual is knowledgeable and truly voluntary, and in disregarding that consent
in situations where the alleged victim does not understand either the circumstances and
consequences of sexual conduct or the extent of her ability to refuse sex, the state has no
legitimate interest in imposing sexual mores on retarded individuals or their consensual
partners.”). Moral disapproval by others might be a relevant social consequence of sexual
activity that one might have to have the capacity to understand at some level, if one would
actually experience welfare effects from others’ moral disapproval.
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intercourse poses more significant risks of pregnancy or sexually transmitted
diseases. Since there are more consequences at issue, the latter will likely
require a higher level of cognitive capacities than the former.168 In sum, the
context of the sexual encounter must be examined to determine which
consequences are actually present for a given sexual decision-maker.
If a person with persistent cognitive impairments does not have the
requisite mental capacities alone to reason about a specific sexual decision and
its consequences, then the court must proceed to the third step and broaden the
inquiry to determine if an adequate decision-making support system is in
place. This support system can take many forms, including friends, family, or
institutional staff. The network will often include people who have been
legally appointed to make decisions for a person with cognitive impairments,
such as a guardian or attorney-in-fact.169 That legal authorization to act as a
surrogate decision-maker, however, is not sufficient to establish that a valid
decision-making support system is in place.170 In other words, a decisionmaking support system does not exist to make the sexual decision as a
surrogate for the person with cognitive impairments, but instead to facilitate
her wishes and desires.
168 This is in some respects similar to the risk-relativity approach in health care

decision-making. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 111, at 51–57. In assessing
capacity, its proponents argue, one must consider the probabilities of benefit and harm
from a given health care treatment, considering the alternatives. The more risky the course
of action, the higher the level of capacity required to engage in it. This creates an
asymmetrical set of capacity requirements—one for accepting a known beneficial
treatment (low), and one for refusing said treatment (high). Id. The approach here is
different in that it would not weight positive and negative consequences differently; the
presence of either would raise the required level of capacity. Thus, the cognition-plus test
avoids some of the critiques of the risk-relativity approach. See, e.g., David Checkland, On
Risk and Decisional Capacity, 26 J. MED. & PHIL. 35, 36 (2001) (criticizing the
asymmetrical nature of the test as confusing the capacity question and the well-being
question). But see Ian Wilks, Asymmetrical Competence, 13 BIOETHICS 154, 158–59 (1999)
(defending asymmetrical capacity). Avoiding asymmetry makes sense in the sexual domain
because of the subjectivity of sex. Ex ante, it is difficult both to predict the mental and
social consequences of sexual activity and to know whether any sexual consequence will
be experienced positively or negatively. This, in turn, makes it impossible to create a
repository of sexual knowledge akin to the repository of medical knowledge about the
likely trajectories of treatment.
169 See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK, THE LAW OF LATER-LIFE HEALTH CARE AND DECISIONMAKING 171–82 (2006) (describing the process of appointing a guardian or selecting an
attorney-in-fact).
170 This is especially true in the United States, with its reliance on plenary
guardianship and its under-use of more tailored guardianship. See Lawrence A. Frolik,
Guardianship Reform: When the Best is the Enemy of the Good, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
347, 348–50 (1998) (noting how statutory changes in limited guardianships have not led to
their widespread adoptions). In other countries, supported decision-making principles are
embedded in the law. See, e.g., Makoto Arai, Guardianship in Japan Under the Adult
Guardianship Law of 2000, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ADULT GUARDIANSHIP
167, 170–71 (A. Kimberley Dayton ed., 2014).
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It is possible that there will be many individuals who are potential
members of the decision-making support system, and they might disagree on
how best to actualize the sexual desires of a person with cognitive
impairments. Ideally, such disagreements will be worked out before the sexual
activity takes place. However, it is not the role of the court to determine the
one true decision-making support system. This is the case for two reasons.
First, this shifts the focus from the person with cognitive impairments to those
around her, but it is the person with cognitive impairments whose desires and
volition should be the focus of the analysis.171 To the extent that she is aided
in actualizing those desires by a supportive network, the court’s only task is to
determine whether that particular network was adequate. Thus, this approach
implicitly favors the supportive network that wishes to actualize the wishes of
the person with impairments, centering the analysis on that person.
Second, as a practical matter, the court need not decide between two
supportive networks that have different opinions about which sexual choice is
best. As it would be deciding the case ex post in a civil or criminal proceeding,
it need only analyze whether the supportive network or portion of the network
that facilitated the sexual relations in question was adequate under the criteria
discussed in this Part. In other words, it need not resolve the dispute of who
represents the “better” network in a more general sense, as the presence of
some other potential supportive network would not be relevant to determining
whether the operative network was actually adequate.172
Whatever individuals comprise the decision-making support system, that
support system must also participate in the making of the relevant sexual
decision in order to prevent liability from flowing to sexual partners or
supervising institutions. For example, consider the following case in which a
support network existed but was not involved in the decision.173 On February
20, 2011, a twenty-six year old woman with moderate intellectual disabilities
was left alone in her mother’s apartment. While highly sociable, her reasoning
and communication skills were significantly impaired. Her caregiver did not
171 See A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship: A Little Hope for
the Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1541, 1547–49 (describing a person-centered philosophy in
the context of guardianship).
172 A court might have to make this determination in other types of proceedings, such
as guardianship. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215 (West 2010) (noting that the right
to “make decisions about his or her social environment or other social aspects of his or her
life” might be removed from a person and given to a guardian). The degree to which a
guardian could legally limit a ward’s “social environment” could not be absolute, given
mandates that guardianship be adopted in its least restrictive form. See, e.g., id. § 744.344
(“The order appointing a guardian must be consistent with the incapacitated person’s
welfare and safety, must be the least restrictive appropriate alternative, and must reserve to
the incapacitated person the right to make decisions in all matters commensurate with the
person’s ability to do so.”). Of course, in practice, some guardians may exert such
influence in spite of the law’s mandates.
173 This narrative is adapted from State v. Inzunza, 316 P.3d 1266, 1269 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2014).
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show up that day, and so she left her mother’s apartment and wandered into
the open door of Miguel Inzunza’s apartment, also in the apartment complex.
While there, she did not say anything, but she did eat a plate of food Miguel
gave her, watched television, listened to music, and followed Miguel into his
bedroom. At 2 a.m. the next morning, the police found them asleep together on
Miguel’s bed. She had hickeys on her neck and breast, Miguel’s DNA was
found on her breast, and her DNA was found on his penis. Miguel claimed that
the sexual activity was consensual.
In this example, the young woman was disconnected from her caregivers
as she wandered into a stranger’s apartment. While a support network might
have existed for her in another context, it was not supporting her decision to
engage in sexual activity with Miguel Inzunza. A person lacking a network at
the time of the sexual decision must be assessed according to the mental
capacities she has alone. If these are insufficient, liability must flow to her
sexual partner and the institution with a responsibility for taking care of her. It
is important to note that involvement of a network in supporting sexual
decision-making by a person with persistent cognitive impairments does not
mean that members of the supportive network necessarily need to be
physically present for the sexual acts. For some severely disabled individuals,
this may be the case, and there is a tradeoff between privacy and sexual
expression in these situations. For most others, involvement of the supportive
network may require something more like appropriate sex education, provision
of contraception, and vetting of the sexual partner in question.174
After verifying the involvement of a decision-making support system, the
court should assess its quality to ensure that it is adequate. This is essentially
an inquiry into the health of the decision-making apparatus as a whole, similar
to the inquiry into the individual’s mental capacities. The principles governing
fiduciary relationships provide useful guideposts for conducting this factintensive and contextual inquiry. A fiduciary is an individual who is in a
position of power and trust with respect to another person, putting that other
person at risk if the fiduciary does not act in her interests.175 Members of the
decision-making support system are in this type of relationship with the person
with cognitive impairments, who relies on them to assist in decision-making
tasks.176
174 See, e.g., KULICK & RYDSTRÖM, supra note 118, at 106–12 (discussing the role of

contracts, group discussions, and roleplays in structuring the sexual education and sexual
activities of people with cognitive impairments); id. at 200–05 (discussing how Danish
“sexual advisors” assist people with persistent cognitive impairments with engaging sex
workers).
175 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 4 (2011) (“While the definitions of
fiduciaries are not identical, all definitions share three main elements: (1) entrustment of
property or power, (2) entrustors’ trust of fiduciaries, and (3) risk to the entrustors
emanating from the entrustment.”).
176 This is not to say that the decision-making support system should necessarily be
considered a fiduciary entity under law, but instead to suggest that fiduciary principles are
helpful for determining whether the decision-making support system is adequate to the
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Because of their position of power and trust, fiduciaries have certain
duties.177 The primary fiduciary duty is one of loyalty: the duty to act in the
interests of the person for whom you are a fiduciary.178 This primarily means
avoiding conflicts of interest.179 In application to the sexual realm, this
suggests that courts should be skeptical of members of a supportive network
who are also engaging in sexual expressions with the person who has cognitive
impairments. This indicates a conflict of interest that could potentially reflect
that the sexual decisions being made do not reflect the preferences of the
person with cognitive impairments.
The no-further-inquiry rule traditionally governs such situations.180 Under
it, a fiduciary is prohibited from engaging in self-dealing, even if these
conflicted transactions are well-meaning.181 Applied in this context, such a
rule would have the effect of deeming conflicted supportive networks per se
inadequate, imposing civil or criminal liability on all sexual partners who were
also members of the decision-making support network.
Such a harsh rule and outcome is unwarranted in this context. Members of
the decision-making support system will often be spouses or other loved ones,
who may be primary targets of sexual interest by the person with cognitive
impairments.182 To rule out all sexual encounters with members of supportive
networks may restrict the desirable sexual options of people with cognitive
impairments completely. At the same time, conflicted networks should not get
a pass; they should be subjected to a rebuttable presumption of network
inadequacy, which can be overcome if sufficient evidence of loyalty and care
task. Legal scholars have applied similar principles to other noneconomic relationships.
See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV.
2401, 2401–02 (1995).
177 There are several different theories justifying the imposition of these fiduciary
duties. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045–49 (1991)
(performing a law and economics analysis of fiduciary relationships); Deborah A. DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 908–15
(discussing voluntary assumption, entrusting, and descriptive theories).
178 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent
has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with
the agency relationship.”).
179 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Counsel’s function is to
assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid
conflicts of interest.”).
180 See, e.g., Wood v. McDonald, 124 N.E.2d 264, 265 (Mass. 1955); Hartmann v.
Hartle, 122 A. 615, 615 (N.J. Ch. 1928).
181 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (“[T]he trustee
is strictly prohibited from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that
otherwise involve or create a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary duties and personal
interests.”).
182 See MARY JOY QUINN, GUARDIANSHIPS OF ADULTS: ACHIEVING JUSTICE,
AUTONOMY, AND SAFETY 73 (2005) (noting that nearly seventy percent of guardians are
family members).
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is supplied to the court. This is consistent with recent scholarly commentary
suggesting a move away from the no-further-inquiry rule for traditional
fiduciary relationships.183 It is also a recognition that one conception of loyalty
may not be appropriate for all types of fiduciary relationships, especially in
domains such as this one, which contain a high frequency of structural
conflicts of interest.184
For the duty of loyalty, the goal in sifting through the evidence is to
ascertain whether members of the supportive network have tried to avoid
conflicts and whether they have adopted an orientation of selflessness towards
the person with cognitive impairments at the center of the network.185 The
evidence would be particularly important to overcome the presumption of
network inadequacy in situations of conflicts of interest. One valuable type of
evidence would be whether the person with cognitive impairments put trust in
the loyalty of individuals who might be in the supportive network. This could
include her acceptance of an individual as a marital partner or her appointment
of someone as an agent for decision-making through a health care or financial
durable power of attorney.186 Other evidence might be testimonial or
documentary in nature, indicating whether or not the person was acting in a
trustworthy and loyal way towards the person with cognitive impairments.187
183 See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or
Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 980–82 (2005) (describing such a rule). But see
generally Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to
Professor John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 543 (2005).
184 See Andrew S. Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 176, 191 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014)
(“Different types of relationship [sic] may implicate different types of trust, as we see for
example when we compare director–shareholder relationships, employer–employee
relationships, parent–child relationships, or husband–wife relationships.”); Langbein, supra
note 183, at 935–37 (describing how the pervasiveness of conflicts of interest may justify
the switch to a best interests rule).
185 See Irit Samet, Fiduciary Loyalty as Kantian Virtue, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 125, 139–40 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds.,
2014) (“In this thin sense of loyalty, the duty to be loyal embodies a ‘juridical’ moral duty,
ie, [sic] a duty to act in a certain way which can be legitimately enforced by the state. The
other ‘thick’ sense of loyalty implies a specific emotional and intellectual orientation
towards one’s principals. It is an attitude in which selfless action comes easily, and
exploitation of weakness is unthinkable.”).
186 See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Personal Delegations, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1231,
1267 (2013) (“Such advance planning is desirable because the principal is in the best
position to select a trustworthy agent who is knowledgeable about the principal’s beliefs
and preferences.”). This is not to say that spouses, health care proxy agents, or attorneysin-fact will always act loyally, but that the person who selected them has already put her
trust in them, which is significant.
187 See Daniel P. Collins, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 491, 494 (1988) (“Direct evidence is either documentary . . . or first-hand
testimony of a person who actually perceived, through one or more of the senses, the
disputed historical fact.”).
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The other primary duty is one of care. The decision-making support
system should “perform their services with prudence, attention, and
proficiency.”188 This requires knowing the subject they are assisting and
providing a safe space for the actualization of sexual desire. In this context,
due care involves having information about the person’s history, preferences,
and forms of communication. Thus, evidence of care could include the degree
of familiarity with the subject and the amount of time that members of the
supportive network have known her, assuming that knowledge was put to good
use. Sufficient care ensures that the supportive network can actualize the
subjective elements of the sexual experience for the person with cognitive
impairments. For an institution, an inquiry into the level of care should seek to
determine whether it performed a thorough analysis of the resident’s capacity,
whether it gathered information about the resident’s history, preferences, and
forms of communication, and whether it kept adequate records of these efforts
to be reviewed by the court if necessary.189
In addition to acquiring and operationalizing knowledge about the
individual, care also involves providing a safe space for sexual expression to
take place and taking reasonable steps to protect the individual with cognitive
impairments from physical harm. This guarantees that the supportive network
has recognized and dealt with the consequences of sex that entail more
objective welfare threats, such as sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted
pregnancy. Evidence of care with respect to these objective welfare effects
could include efforts to enact various consequence-diminishing interventions,
such as birth control to protect against pregnancy or Truvada to protect against
HIV infection.190 Supportive networks can take precautions with respect to the
physical environment as well, to prevent risk of fall or physical injury during
sexual activity.191 In sum, the evidentiary inquiry on the care axis would focus
on whether members of the supportive network have acted as a reasonable or
prudent person or institution would have.192
188 FRANKEL, supra note 175, at 169.
189 See Fay Rozovksy, Informed Consent as a Loss Control Process, in 2 RISK

MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 77, 92–97 (Sylvia M. Brown ed.) (describing
the importance of these types of procedures in the context of informed consent generally).
190 See State v. Dudley, 64 So. 3d 746, 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (en banc)
(describing how the mother of the person with cognitive impairments put her daughter on
Depo-Provera, a form of birth control); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Are We Ready for H.I.V.’s
Sexual Revolution?, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/05/24/opinion/sunday/ready-for-hivs-sexual-revolution.html [http://perma.cc/24ZJLV3N] (describing the use of Truvada by many gay men as an effective pre-exposure
prophylactic against HIV infection).
191 See Marshall B. Kapp, Resident Safety and Medical Errors in Nursing Homes
Reporting and Disclosure in a Culture of Mutual Distrust, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 51, 59–60
(2003) (discussing the problem of falls in nursing homes).
192 See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1039, 1043 (2011) (“The duty of care prescribes the fiduciary’s standard of care by
establishing a ‘reasonableness’ or ‘prudence’ standard in which the meaning of
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This is a familiar standard for institutions, and it provides them with more
certainty and predictability in dealing with resident sexuality and the liability it
might create. The current highly restrictive sexual policies are the result of a
rational risk management strategy focused on exposure avoidance.193 The
strategy is rational because it is a response to a legal regime that would impose
liability for allowing any sexual activity by people with persistent cognitive
impairments. In contrast, the cognition-plus test provides a clear route for
supportive networks, particularly institutions, to avoid unnecessary legal
liability. They only need to pursue adequate procedures that are consistent
with the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, such as thorough assessment,
provision of safety in sexual spaces, and recordkeeping.
In other words, by treating sexual expression similarly to other issues that
are already routinely managed, such as falls, pressure ulcers, or medical
treatment, institutions can move away from an exposure avoidance strategy
and towards a loss prevention or loss reduction strategy that might currently
apply in those other areas.194 This is not to say that all institutions will always
do this; many fail in these other areas so it would be surprising if there were no
failures in this domain as well. In that case, liability will continue to flow, but
institutions now at least have a route towards reducing liability exposure.
Having reviewed the types of evidence that would be relevant to the
capacity analysis, it is important to note the types of evidence that would not
be relevant in a cognition-plus test. Certain facts that are integral to the sexual
encounter would not be per se relevant to the capacity analysis. Examples
include the sex of a subject’s sexual partner or the particular sex act engaged
in with said partner. Similarly, other contextual facts that could trigger moral
evaluation of the sexual situation, such as whether the person with cognitive
impairments is engaging in adultery, or whether the motives of the sexual
partner are benign, would likewise be irrelevant to the capacity analysis unless
some specific link to a relevant step of the cognition-plus test could be
established.
There are at least two plausible routes to relevance. First, it is possible for
such facts to enter the inquiry in a limited way in step two of the cognitionplus test. This step requires assessing the relevant consequences of a particular
sexual decision, as those consequences will dictate the level of mental
capacities needed to process them. For example, the sex of the partner coupled
with particular sexual acts may create the risk of a pregnancy consequence. Or
reasonableness or prudence is informed by industry norms and practices. This standard of
care is objective, measured by reference to a reasonable or prudent person in like
circumstances.”).
193 See Glenn T. Troyer & Leeanne R. Coons, Corporate Compliance: A Risk
Management Framework, in 3 RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 123, 140
(describing this strategy).
194 See Andrew Weinberg, Risk Management and Quality-of-Care Concerns in LongTerm Care, in 7 ETHICS, LAW, AND AGING REVIEW 101, 102–03 (Marshall B. Kapp ed.,
2001).
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the fact that the sex is adulterous may create the risk of fracturing an important
relationship with a spouse-caregiver. Thus, these types of facts may enter the
analysis because they affect the relevant consequences that one must have the
capacity to consider.
Second, certain facts could be relevant in step three of the cognition-plus
test, which requires a deeper assessment of the loyalty of members of the
supportive network in situations of conflict of interest. Thus, the motives of a
conflicted member of supportive network could be relevant to the loyalty
inquiry. In short, these types of facts only enter the analysis in a limited way
for purposes of analyzing consequences or network adequacy, rather than for
purposes of moral judgment. This excludes normative judgments about sex
from the formal analysis of capacity in the legal test, and thus permits people
with persistent cognitive impairments to pursue the wide range of sexual
relationships and practices that those without impairments are entitled to
pursue. For this reason, the cognition-plus test is at least nominally “sexpositive.”195

2. Comparisons with Existing Approaches
To understand how the cognition-plus test differs from other approaches to
sexual consent capacity, it is worth considering the points of convergence and
divergence among the tests. First, there is the nature of the conduct test, which
focuses on volition. Whereas this is the beginning and end of the analysis for
this test, it only represents the beginning for the cognition-plus test. For simple
expressions of sexuality that have few or no consequences, such as holding
hands, the two tests will converge. The nature of the conduct test only requires
volition, and the cognition-plus would only require volition in this case
because there are no significant consequences that need to be understood and
contemplated, with or without a decision-making support system.
The two tests will diverge when sexual contact has significant physical or
nonphysical consequences. Here, a person who can show volition to engage in
sexual contact will automatically achieve legal capacity with the nature of the
conduct test. Whether she does so with the cognition-plus test depends on
whether she has the ability to contemplate the sexual decision on her own or
can do so with the help of an adequate decision-making support system. The
nature of the conduct test would thus permit a far wider range of sexual
conduct, without concern for whether the person consenting could contemplate
the consequences of the action, alone or assisted. People with severe and
persistent cognitive impairments who act without a network are far more
vulnerable to negative welfare threats under a nature of the conduct test as
opposed to under the cognition-plus test.
195 See Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 91 (2014) (“A ‘sexpositive’ approach that values sexual pleasure in itself requires lawmakers and legal
scholars to undertake a more honest assessment of what we choose to regulate, what we
fail to regulate, and our justifications for these choices.”).
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The nature and consequences test focuses on mental capacity. It converges
with the cognition-plus test in situations when a person with cognitive
impairments can still understand and process the sexual decision’s
consequences, either because the impairments are not so severe, or because the
consequences are not so complex. It diverges in cases of people with persistent
cognitive impairments who do not have the mental capacities on their own to
process a sexual decision. The cognition-plus test would allow those who fall
into this situation to experience sexual expression if they have an adequate
decision-making support system in place. In other words, the nature and
consequences test would impose complete bans on sexual expression for many
individuals with persistent cognitive impairments, whereas the cognition-plus
would allow a route to a sexual life, provided adequate safeguards in the form
of a supported decision-making network exist.
The contextual approach focuses on all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the sexual act. It converges with the cognition-plus test in that it
considers more than just the mental capacities of the subject and does not
permit blanket prohibitions on sexual conduct just because of cognitive
impairment. It diverges in the amount of contextual information that is
considered to be relevant and in the amount of normative guidance that is
provided in assessing the information in a given case. The contextual approach
is openly normative and could examine the nature of the sexual relationship
and even possibly the nature of the sexual acts involved. In contrast, the
cognition-plus test keeps a narrow focus on the quality of the decision-making
machinery, inclusive of the individual’s mental capacities and decisional
network. Facts that might trigger moral evaluation only enter the analysis to
the extent that they are relevant to some other step of the test. In sum, the
contextual approach considers too much, running the risk of inhibiting sexual
capability among populations whose sexuality is already societally disfavored,
whereas the cognition-plus test removes such judgments from the purview of
the judge.
The cognition-plus test represents an improvement on existing sexual
incapacity doctrines for people with persistent cognitive impairments. It strikes
the correct balance between protection and restriction, has a sound theoretical
basis, guards against courts dictating which sexual acts are appropriate, and
provides more predictability to institutions in formulating resident sexual
policies and practices.

3. Limitations
Despite its significant advantages, the cognition-plus test does have some
limitations. The first limitation is one that is confronted by any sexual
incapacity doctrine, which is the fact that the cognition-plus test will not be
able to prevent all sexual assault or exploitation of those with cognitive
impairments. Justice Holmes’s “bad man” will find a way around any sexual
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incapacity test that we might construct.196 Thus, the question is not whether all
sexual danger has been avoided, as that is impossible. It is whether we have
found the best practical ways to reduce its prevalence, taking into account the
costs of doing so in the form of restricting sexual opportunities.197 Current
doctrines have failed to reduce sexual violence completely, and they have
come at the great cost of creating restrictive sexual environments for people
with persistent incapacities.
Much of the discussion in this Article has centered on finding ways for
people with persistent cognitive impairments to achieve sexual lives, but it is
important to note that liability will still flow to sexual partners or institutions
in situations with which many might be concerned. Liability will flow when
the subject is incapable of expressing volition.198 Unlike situations of
temporary transient incapacity, the court can examine whether such a
volitional capacity was present at the time of the sexual encounter because the
conditions causing the incapacity are more stable. Liability will flow when she
is unaided by a supportive network and cannot understand the nature and
consequences of the sexual decision or that there is a choice to be made. Thus,
perpetrators who prey on isolated people with cognitive impairments have no
legal recourse. Liability will flow when she cannot understand the nature and
consequences of the sexual decision and her supportive network is inadequate.
If perpetrators are part of a supportive network themselves, which might
unfortunately be the case in many instances, they face a presumption of
network inadequacy they must overcome to avoid liability. Together, these
cover a wide range of the problematic situations of abuse and exploitation that
are reachable by the law, at much lower cost to the sexual lives of people with
persistent cognitive impairments. Of course, the prosecution of such claims
will still be plagued by evidentiary problems, problems of non-enforcement of
sexual assault law, and the like, but these are problems common to all
doctrines in this space.199
Second, even if everyone had adequate supportive networks in place, the
cognition-plus test alone cannot and will not force decision-making networks
to be supportive of sexual expression. While local decision-making networks
may be superior to removed judges in understanding the sexual context of
196 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459

(1897).

197 See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 182 (2001) (arguing that legal feminism has problematically
reduced discussions of sexuality to either dependency or danger).
198 While this is technically separate from the sexual incapacity doctrine, if the law
were to incorporate an affirmative consent standard, and there are good arguments that it
should, liability will flow if she does not affirmatively consent in a way that is appropriate
to her forms of communication. See generally Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist
Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217 (1989) (arguing for an affirmative consent standard).
199 See Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 221, 221–22 (describing the difficulties the criminal law has with successfully
preventing sexual assault).
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people with disabilities, they may in fact hold some of the same societal biases
that historically plague judges in implementing incapacity doctrines.200
Members of these networks may prevent sexual expression before it can
happen due to stereotypes they might hold about people with disabilities. Since
sexual incapacity doctrines only apply in situations in which sexual activity
has taken place, they will not be able to ameliorate these types of situations.
This reveals the limits of the law in this area, and perhaps generally. Without
more intrusive sexual regulation of all local decision-making behavior, which
would be undesirable for other reasons, the best that can be hoped for is that
doctrines allow those networks that wish to facilitate the sexuality of people
with persistent cognitive impairments the ability to do so. A less stigmatizing
set of laws in this area might be able to exert positive expressive pressure on
social norms around the sexuality of people with disabilities in the long run as
well.
Finally, the cognition-plus test represents only a partial solution to
realizing the sexual capabilities of people with persistent cognitive
impairments. The law is only one of many disabling features of the social
environment.201 In addition to the biased attitudes already noted, many people
with persistent cognitive impairments might not be embedded in an adequate
supportive network in the first place, whether due to social isolation, lack of
funding for long-term care facilities and staff, or overburdened caregivers.202
Thus, changing the legal test for sexual incapacity is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for realizing the sexual capability of people with
persistent cognitive impairments. It needs to be part of a multi-pronged
approach that includes pursuing litigation in related areas, allocating more
resources to these issues, and pursuing policy and regulatory reforms.203
200 See Julian C. Hughes et al., Sexuality in Dementia, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF

DEMENTIA 227, 229 (Charles Foster et al. eds., 2014) (noting family member discomfort
with their relatives with dementia having sexual intercourse and staff discomfort with
same-sex sexual expression in residential facilities).
201 See TOM SHAKESPEARE ET AL., THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF DISABILITY: UNTOLD
DESIRES 16–43 (1996) (discussing the various barriers to being sexual among people with
disabilities).
202 See MARGARET C. JASPER, HOSPITAL LIABILITY LAW 86 (2d ed. 2008) (“More than
one-half of American nursing homes are below the suggested minimum staffing level for
nurse’s aides, and more than one-third of nursing homes fell below the suggested minimum
staffing level registered nurses. Of total licensed staff, nearly one-fourth of all nursing
homes routinely fall below the suggested minimum staffing level.”); John V. Jacobi,
Federal Power, Segregation, and Mental Disability, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1231, 1234 (2003)
(calling for action on the isolation of people with mental disabilities); Richard L. Kaplan,
Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 407, 409 (2007) (discussing the problems in the funding of long-term care); Donna R.
Lenhoff, LTC Regulation and Enforcement: An Overview from the Perspective of Residents
and Their Families, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 9, 11 (2005) (noting the problem of understaffing in
long-term facilities).
203 See DOUGLAS WORNELL, SEXUALITY AND DEMENTIA 159 (2014) (noting how sex
workers may have a role to play in addressing the sexual needs of older adults with
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With the principles and mechanics of the test in place, and an
understanding of how it differs from other approaches and has its limits, the
next Part explores its application in more detail to the population of older
adults with cognitive impairments. Specifically, it applies the cognition-plus
test to the case of Henry and Donna Rayhons, a context of persistent acquired
incapacity in the form of dementia.

B. Application to Older Adults with Dementia
The opening narrative of Henry and Donna Rayhons is an example of the
situation of many older adults with cognitive impairments, but it is not the
only one.204 It reveals some key points about the context of persistent acquired
incapacity, particularly with older adults. First, as a demographic matter,
dementia is rising in importance due to the aging of the population. Over 5
million people currently suffer from dementia in the United States, most of
them over the age of 65.205 By 2050, it is estimated that over 13 million people
will have Alzheimer’s Disease, the most common cause of dementia.206 This
condition causes deficits in communication, attention, reasoning, and
judgment.207 The disease’s hallmark, however, is its effect on memory.208 It
worsens both semantic memory, which relates to general knowledge, and

dementia); David F. Bragg, Dealing with Nursing Home Neglect: The Need for Private
Litigation, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (noting the importance of private litigation to
keep nursing homes from neglecting residents); Marilyn Denny, “This Is Who I Am, Don’t
Let Them Move Me:” Autonomy in Nursing Homes, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 203, 223–
24 (1999) (discussing the need to fund ombudsmen to safeguard the autonomy of
individuals in long-term care facilities); Marshall B. Kapp, Nursing Home Restraints and
Legal Liability: Merging the Standard of Care and Industry Practice, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 1,
16 (1992) (discussing policy and litigation responses to the improper use of restraints by
nursing homes).
204 See, e.g., Marie-Therese Connolly, When the Mind Falters, Is Sex a Choice?,
WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/09/18/AR2009091801144_pf.html [http://perma.cc/SS2W-BBHN] (collected
stories); Melinda Henneberger, An Affair to Remember, SLATE (June 10, 2008),
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/family/2008/06/%20an_affair_to_remember.html [http://
perma.cc/P7KR-5WCP] (telling the tragic story of a ninety-five-year-old man and eightytwo-year-old woman who found romance in an assisted living facility and then were
separated by staff and a family member of the man).
205 See Alzheimer’s Ass’n, 2014 Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures, 10
ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA e47, e54 (2014).
206 See Hebert et al., supra note 22, at 1120.
207 See Peter V. Rabins, Dementia and Alzheimer’s Disease: An Overview, 35 GA. L.
REV. 451, 452 (2001).
208 See Andrea Schaffner, Understanding Dementia, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 372,
373 (2010) (“Memory deficit is one of the hallmarks of dementia.”).
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episodic memory, which deals more with autobiographical knowledge.209
Typically, dementias progressively worsen over time, though in the short term
they may include fluctuating levels of capacity.210
Second, sexuality does not disappear with age, even very old age.211 The
form of sex, however, may change from being more genital in nature to taking
on other forms of intimacy.212 Sexuality may even take on greater importance
for people with degenerative cognitive conditions such as Alzheimer’s
Disease, as it can help provide a sense of connection to other people. This is
particularly important for people who lose social relationships as they age,
especially if they enter institutions.213 Alzheimer’s Disease may also cause
disinhibition in sexual behaviors, leading people with the condition to seek out
sex more than they did in the past.214
Third, many people with these conditions live in the context of
institutions.215 These institutions are not generally sex-positive, as staff either
209 See Taylor Kuhn & Russell M. Bauer, Episodic and Semantic Memory Disorders,

in HANDBOOK ON THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF AGING AND DEMENTIA 401, 402 (Lisa D.
Ravin & Heather L. Katzen eds., 2013).
210 See ALAN JACQUES & GRAHAM A. JACKSON, UNDERSTANDING DEMENTIA 53–65
(3d ed. 2000).
211 See Stacy Tessler Lindau et al., A Study of Sexuality and Health Among Older
Adults in the United States, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 762, 762 (2007) (noting that fifty-three
percent of those aged sixty-five to seventy-four and twenty-six percent of those seventyfive to eighty-five were still having sex); see also Alexander Warso, Something Catchy:
Nursing Home Liability in the Senior Sexually Transmitted Disease Epidemic, 22 ELDER
L.J. 491, 500–01 (2014) (discussing the problem of sexually transmitted diseases among
older adults).
212 See Ramzi R. Hajjar & Hosam K. Kamel, Sex and the Nursing Home, 19 CLINICS
GERIATRIC MED. 575, 576 (2003) (“[T]here is a shift from genital sex to intimacy, and
other means to express lifelong sexual desires, as people age.”).
213 See Steven H. Miles & Kara Parker, Sexuality in the Nursing Home: Iatrogenic
Loneliness, 1999 GENERATIONS 36, 37 (describing iatrogenic loneliness); Sally M. Roach,
Sexual Behaviour of Nursing Home Residents: Staff Perceptions and Responses, 48 J.
ADVANCED NURSING 371, 378 (2004) (“Sexual sensations are among the last of the
pleasure-giving biological processes to deteriorate, and are an enduring source of
gratification at a time when pleasures are becoming fewer and fewer.” (citing Kaplan H.S.,
Sex, Intimacy, and the Aging Process, 18 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOANALYSIS 185 (1990))).
214 See Leslie M. Lothstein et al., Risk Management and Treatment of Sexual
Disinhibition in Geriatric Patients, 61 CONN. MED. 609, 609 (1997) (noting the
phenomenon and discussing treatment options for such behaviors). But see Antonette M.
Zeiss, An Observational Study of Sexual Behavior in Demented Male Patients, 51A J.
GERONTOLOGY M325, M329 (1996) (concluding that sexual disinhibition is less frequent
than assumed).
215 See Andrew Casta-Kaufteil, The Old & the Restless: Mediating Rights to Intimacy
for Nursing Home Residents with Cognitive Impairments, 8 J. MED. & L. 69, 70 (2004)
(“Alzheimer’s disease is responsible for half of the nursing home residencies in this
Country.” (citing LAWRENCE FROLIK & MELISSA C. BROWN, ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR
DISABLED CLIENT: LEGAL, HEALTH CARE, FINANCIAL AND ESTATE PLANNING (2d ed.
2003))); Hajjar & Kamel, supra note 212, at 575.

2015]

SEXUALITY AND INCAPACITY

1249

ignore resident sexuality or try to actively prevent it due to biases against older
adult sexuality or fear of legal liability.216 Nursing homes are frequently
targets for lawsuits, and permitting sexual contact with a resident who cannot
consent opens another font of potential liability.217 Perhaps in recognition that
resident sexuality is something that cannot be swept under the rug anymore,
the American Medical Directors Association recently called on nursing homes
to formulate policies on the sexual behavior of residents, as only one in four
nursing homes had one.218
With that background on the importance and characteristics of the aging
population with cognitive impairments, we now turn to how the cognition-plus
test might apply to this group, using the Rayhons example. The first step in
applying the cognition-plus test is to analyze whether there is volition. In the
case of Donna, the criminal case against Henry rested not on some claim that
Donna did not say yes, but that she could not say yes.219 Nonetheless, this first
step may raise issues in similar contexts. First, the ways in which a person
with persistent cognitive impairments communicates volition may vary
significantly. For example, Henry described Donna as the one to initiate sex,
and she would do so by saying “Shall we play a bit?”220 Assuming the
accuracy of this statement, this is not something one would know without
216 See Ann Christine Frankowski & Leanne J. Clark, Sexuality and Intimacy in

Assisted Living: Residents’ Perspectives and Experiences, 6 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y
25, 31 (2009) (noting the minimal policies on sexuality among residents); Hosam K.
Kamel & Ramzi R. Hajjar, Sexuality in the Nursing Home, Part 2: Managing Abnormal
Behavior-Legal and Ethical Issues, 4 J. AM. MED. DIR. ASS’N, 203, 204 (2003) (noting
fears of liability among nursing home staff); Marshall B. Kapp, Legal Anxieties and Endof-Life Care in Nursing Homes, 19 ISSUES L. & MED. 111, 122 (2003) (“A certain amount
of generalized fear and loathing of anything connected to the law, lawyers, or the legal
process is innate among all health care providers, especially in the [end-of-life] context.”);
Belinda Kessel, Sexuality in the Older Person, 30 AGE & AGEING 121, 121 (2001)
(describing how people generally see older adult sexuality as either nonexistent, funny, or
disgusting); Kathleen S. Mayers & Dennis McBride, Sexuality Training for Caretakers of
Geriatric Residents in Long Term Care Facilities, 16 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 227, 230
(1998) (noting how it is simply easier to ignore resident sexuality).
217 See, e.g., Katie Thomas, Facing Suits, a Nursing Home in California Seeks
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/18/business/
facing-suits-a-nursing-home-seeks-bankruptcy.html [http://perma.cc/7KB8-WW7W] (noting
the rise in bankruptcies among nursing homes, due in part to lawsuits).
218 See Bryan Gruley, Sex Among Seniors with Dementia Spurs Call for Policies,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-28/sexamong-demented-spurs-group-to-call-for-policies [http://perma.cc/P74W-2G6R].
219 In fact, in many cases of older adults in institutions seeking sexual pleasure,
volition is not an issue, as they seek ways of expressing sexuality in the face of hostility
from staff. See, e.g., Carole Archibald, Sexuality and Dementia: The Role Dementia Plays
When Sexual Expression Becomes a Component of Residential Care Work, 4 ALZHEIMER’S
CARE Q. 137, 139–40 (2003) (telling the story of Will and Wilma who “were adamant they
wanted to continue their relationship and this was obvious by the different means they used
to outwit staff”).
220 See supra text accompanying note 2.
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extensive knowledge of the person with the impairment. Second, whether or
not there was volition could be an issue in another case. The well-documented
evidentiary issues around expressed consent in non-incapacity sexual assault
cases are also lurking in the background of incapacity cases.221
The second step is to assess the mental capacities of the subject in light of
the relevant consequences.222 Here, we do not know the exact mental faculties
of Donna, but we do know she was cognitively impaired. To establish whether
the cognitive abilities she had were sufficient for the sexual decisions she was
making, we would need to know more about the types of sex in which Donna
and Henry might have engaged. There are several reasons why the universe of
consequences may be less complicated for Donna and Henry, though, and
perhaps for many other similarly situated older adults with dementia. First, the
pregnancy consequence will often not be present, as women have aged past the
period of fertility.223 Less is known about male fertility, but it is commonly
assumed to last longer, even if it might decline with age.224 Thus, older men
who have access to fertile female partners may still have to deal with the
potential consequences of pregnancy. Same-sex sexual expressions will never
lead to pregnancy, exempting sexual contacts between members of the same
anatomical sex from the pregnancy consequence altogether. Thus, typically
older women, older men who have older women as sexual partners, and those
who exclusively pursue same-sex partners need not have the capacity to
consider this physical consequence, which may result in a lower level of
required mental capacities to process the decision.225
221 See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence,

Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 123 (1992)
(“Cases of sexualized violence often evolve into a ‘he said, she said’ battle of competing
narratives in which the ‘he,’ who is the defendant, wins by default simply because the
evidence is contested.”). There are also genuine issues of sexual assault in nursing home
contexts. See Lisa Tripp, The Medico-Legal Aspects of Dementia-Driven Sexual Abuse in
Nursing Homes, 12 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 363, 377–78 (2011) (discussing the problem
of dementia-driven sexual abuse in nursing homes).
222 Several tools of cognitive assessment have been proposed. See Martin Lyden,
Assessment of Sexual Consent Capacity, 25 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 3, 10 (2007);
Stephanie L. Tang, Note, When “Yes” Might Mean “No”: Standardizing State Criteria to
Evaluate the Capacity to Consent to Sexual Activity for Elderly with Neurocognitive
Disorders, 22 ELDER L.J. 449, 484–87 (2015) (reviewing various tests).
223 See Vera Bittner, Menopause and Cardiovascular Risk, 47 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY
1984, 1984 (2006) (noting the average age of onset of menopause as 51.4).
224 See Mohamed A. M. Hassan & Stephen R. Killick, Effect of Male Age on Fertility:
Evidence for the Decline in Male Fertility with Increasing Age, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY
1520, 1525–26 (2003).
225 This understanding of the capacity test will likely not pose significant constitutional
difficulties. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 472–73
(1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding a statutory rape law that differentially treated men
and women due to the different pregnancy risks involved); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (per curiam) (adopting a life course perspective by holding
that distinctions based on age do not pose constitutional difficulties). The distinction drawn
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Second, the impairment itself may affect what the relevant consequences
are. If one cannot retain the psychological effects of sexual expression, the
mental and social consequences are far less relevant for a given person. For
example, someone who would experience negative feelings about engaging in
sexual activities outside marriage, but who is not capable of remembering
doing so, will not experience the negative psychological consequences of
engaging in this activity.226 In this case, it is not necessary that the individual
have the ability to process such a consequence in order to engage in that
activity. In contrast, delirium creates short bursts of significant impairment
followed by periods of lucidity. This situation should be treated similarly to
other temporary impairments such as intoxication, as a less-impaired self will
reemerge who will have to deal with the mental and social consequences of the
sexual behavior.
Third, as noted earlier, people with cognitive impairments may undertake
various consequence-diminishing interventions, such as birth control or
Truvada, to protect themselves from the negative consequences of sexual
contact, with the assistance of a supportive network. These types of
interventions will reduce the number of relevant consequences one needs to be
able to process to have legal capacity. This, in turn, should reduce the required
level of capacity. Of course, just because one can intervene does not mean one
should. Requiring STD testing or safer sex practices of potential sexual
partners are interventions that may not only reduce the sphere of privacy that
an individual enjoys, but may also reduce the overall availability of sexual
partners. This restriction of partner choice thus limits the sexual opportunities
of people with cognitive impairments. The correct course of action in these
circumstances would need to be resolved on a case-by-case basis, with as
much input from the person with impairments as possible.
Thus, for some in this population, the consequences of sexual expression
will be fewer than if they had sexual relations at an earlier age without
impairments and without consequence-diminishing interventions. For Donna,
it is possible that she did not face a wide variety of relevant consequences
because of her age, condition, and context, and she might thus satisfy the
second step of this test. If this was not the case, then the third step of assessing
the decisional support system comes into play.

between gays and lesbians and straight men and women may pose difficulties, depending
on whether the Court applies strict scrutiny to sexual orientation. See generally Edward
Stein, Immutability and Innateness Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights,
89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597 (2014) (discussing the arguments put forth in the briefs of recent
same-sex marriage cases).
226 This situation is not unheard of; Justice Sandra Day O’Connor experienced this
with her husband, who had Alzheimer’s and developed a relationship with another woman
in the nursing home. See Kate Zernike, Love in the Time of Dementia, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/weekinreview/18zernike.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/6J37-92UP].
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Donna was in the fortunate situation of having many individuals who
provided care for her, including her husband Henry, her daughters, and nursing
home staff. These individuals varied in their assessments of her mental
capacity to have sex. The daughters did not believe she had capacity, and a
relatively cursory medical examination of her cognitive capacities led a doctor
at the nursing home to agree. Henry Rayhons clearly had a different opinion.
Ideally, all those individuals and institutions that surrounded Donna would
have acted together to try to respect and facilitate Donna’s sexual desires.227
This, however, did not happen. In applying the legal test, a court need not
decide which part of the supportive network should “win out.” It need only
assess the decision-making support network that is at issue in a particular
sexual decision.
In this case, the only individual who was facilitating Donna’s sexual
activity was Henry, and thus he is the supportive network that must be
evaluated for its adequacy. Because Henry is in a conflicted position by virtue
of being Donna’s alleged sexual partner, there is a rebuttable presumption that
Henry, as the supportive network, is inadequate. In assessing whether he can
overcome this presumption, one must evaluate the evidence of his loyalty and
care. On the axis of loyalty, we might look to Donna and Henry’s relationship
for evidence of whether he acted in her interests, apart from his conflicted
position with respect to sex. We know that they were married, which indicates
that at least at some level Donna trusted Henry as a partner. Delving deeper
into what we know of Donna and Henry’s relationship, it appears that it was a
mutually supportive and loving, including after her diagnosis.
On the axis of care, a court would examine Henry’s competence to act as a
supportive network. This includes whether he had knowledge of Donna’s
history, preferences, and forms of communication, which he likely did based
on his close relationship with her. Also important is whether he created a safe
space for the sexual activity to take place, reducing the risk of objective
welfare threats derived from sex. While pregnancy is not a concern, sexually
transmitted disease may have been depending on Henry’s health status. A
further concern might have been the quality of the physical space in which
they might have had sex, as risk of falling is a primary concern for older adults
due to the risk of hip fractures.228
Although it might be helpful to know a little more in order to fully assess
whether Henry Rayhons could overcome the presumption of network
227 This is actually the optimal strategy for the nursing facility in terms of risk

management as well. See TOM FLEWETT, CLINICAL RISK MANAGEMENT 38 (2010) (“Best
practice in the assessment and management of risk is to include the patient and family at all
stages wherever possible.”).
228 In an interview after his acquittal, Henry stated that one of the reasons that he did
not have sex with her in the nursing home was because the bed was too small. See Pam
Belluck, An Intimacy that Outlasted Dementia, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/health/an-intimacy-that-outlasted-dementia.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/923H-322F].
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inadequacy created by his sexual conflict of interest, it appears that there is
significant evidence that he was acting as an adequate support network for
Donna. If this was indeed the case, then Donna would be deemed to have legal
capacity under the third step of the cognition-plus test, if she had not already
passed it under the second step. More importantly, perhaps, the prosecution
might not have pressed charges for a relatively weak case, basing it solely on
the mental capacities of Donna, as required by current law.






The relative position of older adults with cognitive impairments is
improved through the adoption of a cognition-plus test. Provided that there is
volition, some of these individuals may satisfy the test simply because several
of the consequences of sexual expression may not be present in this
population, reducing the level of cognitive capacities needed to process the
sexual decision. Age removes the possibility of pregnancy for many in this
group, and sexually transmitted diseases can be screened by caregivers. Some
of the mental and social consequences of sex may also not register due to the
memory impairments that are characteristic of dementia. Others may satisfy
the test despite exposure to these consequences due to the presence of a
supportive network of family members or nursing home staff, provided that
they adequately actualize individual sexual desires in a safe environment. This
helps to make it easier for institutions to deal with legal liability, moving from
an exposure avoidance strategy of risk management to a loss prevention or loss
reduction framework.

V. CONCLUSION
Both sexuality and incapacity are inescapable features of the human
condition. They need not be mutually exclusive, but current sexual incapacity
doctrines make them so for many, by creating unduly restrictive sexual
environments and contributing to pernicious social norms. This Article has
offered a way forward by reconfiguring sexual incapacity doctrines so that
they are not a disabling force for people with persistent cognitive impairments.
First, it has offered a novel theoretical basis for the doctrine—sexual
capability—which accounts for the internal as well as external threats to selfdetermination. Second, it has proposed a new legal test—cognition-plus—
which is grounded in the lived experiences of people with persistent cognitive
impairments. This approach strikes the correct balance between protection and
restriction, has a sound theoretical basis, guards against courts dictating which
sexual acts are appropriate, and provides more predictability to institutions in
formulating resident sexual policies and practices.

